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PREFERENTIAL REMEDIES 
FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
Harry T. Edwards* and Barry L. Zaretsky** 
JT is no secret that throughout our history discrimination against 
minorities and women has been a hallmark of American society. 
Although some effort has been made to abrogate existing dis-
crimination and eliminate the effects of two hundred years of in-
equity, we are still far from the goal of equality for all. Over twenty 
years ago, in Brown v. Board of Education,1 the Supreme Court 
struck down the doctrine of "separate but equal" and declared that 
the Constitution requires "color blindness" in dealing with people 
of different races. More specifically, the Court held that forced ra-
cial segregation of children in public schools (and, by implication, in 
any other state activity) was unconstitutional. As an abstract idea, 
the principle of color blindness-that factors such as race cannot be 
used as indicators of merit or worth-is extremely attractive. How-
ever, in the two decades since Brown it has become obvious that 
the goal of racial equality will never be reached solely through ad-
herence to this neutral principle. 2 While the principle of color 
blindness is just, it has failed to effectively alter long-standing pat-
terns of race and sex discrimination in this country. This failure is 
due, at least in part, to the difficulty involved in proving noncompli-
ance with an order to act in a "neutral" or "nondiscriminatory" 
fashion. More importantly, ordering an offender to discontinue a 
discriminatory practice has simply proved ineffectual without sup-
porting affirmative relief. The inherent limitations of the principle 
of color blindness and the need for more definite affirmative relief 
are best seen in the context of employment discrimination. 
When Congress passed title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.S. 1962, Cornell University; J.D. 
1965, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
** Assistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University. B.A. 1971, New York 
University; J.D. 1974, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1· (1971) 
(school segregation); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974) (employ-
ment discrimination). See generally Blumrosen, Quotas, Common Sense, and Law 
in Labor Relations: Three Dimensions of Equal Opportunity, 21 RuroERs L. REV. 
675 (1974). 
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1964,3 it plainly recognized equal employment opportunity as an es-
sential national goal. To effectuate this goal, the courts and various 
federal agencies in the past decade have developed the notion of 
"affirmative action."4 Efforts to implement a policy of equal em-
ployment opportunity through the use of affirmative action programs 
received great support until many people realized that equal rights 
for minority members and women would mean increased competi-
tion for limited job opportunities. This realization has led to cries 
of "reverse discrimination" in response to affirmative action and to 
calls for applying the principle of color blindness that in reality may 
be disguised attempts to keep minorities and women from gaining 
in the job market. The current recession has caused increased inter-
est in the legal, economic, and moral issues surrounding the legiti-
macy of affirmative action; since the number of available jobs has 
become more limited, an employer may in fact be forced to hire a 
minority member or female for a position formerly reserved for a 
white male. 5 
A basic thesis of this article is that much of the current concern 
about alleged "reverse discrimination" in employment ignores the 
reality of the situation. In Part I it will be contended that although 
color blindness is a laudable long-run objective, it alone will not end 
discrimination; thus, it will be argued that some form of "<:olor con-
scious" affirmative action must be employed in order to achieve 
equal employment opportunity for minorities and women. The most 
effective form of affirmative action is temporary preferential treat-
ment, 6 and it will be asserted in Part II that such relief can be justi-
fied under the Constitution. Similarly, in Part m, it will be argued 
that preferential remedies can be justified under present statutory 
provisions governing employment discrimination. Finally, in Part 
IV, two conclusions will be drawn: first, that while it is accurate 
to suggest that some minority persons or women who currently bene-
fit from preferential remedies might not have been hired but /or 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to -17 (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973), 
4. "Affirmative action" and "preferential remedies" are distinguishable concepts; 
the latter is subsumed by the former. "Affirmative action," in a general sense, in-
cludes a number of remedies for employment discrimination, such as governmental 
agency prods to get employers to make good faith efforts to hire or promote more 
minorities or women, special training programs for minorities and women, and pref-
erential hirings or promotions for minorities or women. Only the last-cited remedy, 
i.e., preferential hirings and promotions, positively requires an employer to give pref-
erence to qualified minority persons or women (usually over white males) when hir-
ing, promoting, or retaining employees in certain designated job positions. 
5. See authorities cited in note 161 infra. 
6. Cf. note 4 supra. 
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their race or sex, this does not mean that these individuals are not 
qualified, and second, that the opponents of preferential remedies 
have grossly exaggerated the impact of such remedies by failing to 
recognize that, in reality, the cases in which preferential remedies 
have been ordered have generally involved small numbers of posi-
tions and have imposed the remedy for relatively short periods of 
time. 
Before proceeding, however, it is necessary to point out that this 
article will take a broad approach, sometimes sacrificing specificity 
in an attempt to provide an overview to the problem of preferential 
remedies. It is hoped that this overview will demonstrate that the 
true value of the preferential remedy is in raising the consciousness 
of the community and encouraging voluntary affirmative action pro-
grams that will, by putting people together in the workplace, teach 
that all are equal. 
I. THE NEED FOR PREFERENTIAL REMEDIES 
Despite the Supreme Court's mandate of color blindness in 
Brown7 and the sweeping civil rights legislation that followed ten 
years later, 8 statistics demonstrate that Blacks are still far behind 
white males in the employment market. For example, in 1973 the 
median income for black families was only $7,269, compared to 
$12,595 for white families.9 The ratio of median family income of 
Blacks to Whites decreased in the period 1969-1973 from 0.61 to 
0.5.8, 10 indicating that income differentials actually increased as we 
entered the seventies. In almost every major occupational category, 
the income of black males trails that of white males;11 furthermore, 
Blacks have a disproportionately low percentage of the more desir-
1. See also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
8. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 U.S.C. § 1447, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-75d, 
2000a to 2000h-6 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17 (Supp. III, 1973). 
9. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CuRRENT POPULATION 
REPORTS, SPECIAL Sn!DIES, SERIES P-23, No. 48, Tim SocIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS 
OF TIIE BLACK POPULATION IN TIIE UNITED STATES 1973, at 17 (1974) [hereinafter 
1973 CuRRENT POPULATION REPORTS]. The Bureau of the Census recently reported 
that the jobless rate for Blacks in 1974 was 13.7 per cent, while the rate for Whites 
was 7 .6 per cent. It was also reported that the median income for a black family 
was $7800 in 1974, an increase of 7.4 per cent over 1973. But, after adjusting for 
the effects of inflation, actual purchasing power of black families declined by 3.2 per 
cent. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURR.ENT POPULATION 
REPORTS, SPECIAL Sn!DIES, SERIES P-23, No. 54, 'fim SocIAL AND EcONOMIC STATUS 
OF TIJE BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1974, at 24, 53 (1975). 
10. 1973 CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, supra note 9, at 1. 
11. Id. at 59. Some of the disparities may be attributable to differences in age, 
education, and job experience of Blacks and Whites. Id. at 52. 
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able jobs in our economy.12 In addition, the proportion of Blacks 
·below the low-income level seems to have increased; in 1959 about 
one quarter of the persons below the low-income level were Black, 
while in 1973 Blacks made up approximately one third of this 
,group.13 A comparison of unemployment rates further evidences 
our lack of progress toward equalizing the employment situation of 
Blacks and Whites. In 1960, the ratio of black unemployed workers 
to white was 2.1 to 1. By 1970 this ratio had decreased to 1.8 to 
1, but by 1973 it was again 2.1 to 1.14 Although part of this trend 
is attributable to changes in family structure and other sociological 
factors, 15 it nevertheless suggests that the progress toward equal em-
ployment opportunity made in the sixties has slowed, if not stopped, 
in the seventies. 
Considerable disparity is also evident between the economic 
status of women and that of white males. In 1972, the median in-
come for full-time female workers was $5,903, compared to $10,202 
for males.16 In 1970, the median income for women was 59.4 per 
cent of the median income for men, a gap considerably wider than 
that existing in 1955 when the median income for women was 63.9 
per cent of the median income for men.17 Furthermore, in 1970, 
13.5 per cent of full-time male workers earned at least $15,000 per 
year, while only 1.1 per cent of full-time female workers were in 
that salary range.18 Even in general occupational groups, women 
earn considerably less than their male counterparts.19 Although this 
disparity in large part reflects the fact that women hold the lower-
level jobs within most of these groups, 20 women also tend to lag in 
12. See id. at 56 (Table 40, Occupation of the Employed Population: 1973). 
13. Id. at 29. 
14. Id. at 45. 
15. See id. at 1. ("[T]he changes in the overall (income) ratio reflect, in part, 
the changes in the mix of the population, such as changes in the proportion of hus-
band-wife families with wives in the paid labor force, the proportion of families 
headed by women, the number of earners in a family, occupational distribution, and 
work experience patterns"). 
16. EMPLOYMENT SrANDARDS .ADMN., WOMAN'S BUREAU, DEPT. OF LABOR, HIGH• 
LIGHTS OF WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION 1 (1974). 
17. EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMN,, WOMAN'S BUREAU, DEPT. OF WOR, FAcr 
SHEET ON TiiE EARNINGS GAP 1 (1971) [hereinafter 1971 FACT SHEET]. 
18. Id. at 3. 
19. Id. at 2. 
20. In public elementary and secondary schools, women were less than 20 per 
cent of the principals, superintendents, deputy, associate, and assistant superin-
tendents, and other central office administrators in 1970-1971. 
Among professional and technical workers in business, women are concen-
trated in the class B and class C computer programer positions, while men are 
more frequently employed in the higher paying class A positions. Similarly, 
women are usually in the lowest category of draftsmen and engineering techni-
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earnings when compared to men employed in the same jobs. 21 In 
addition, the failure of women to enter the higher paying jobs in 
many occupational groups may be attributable to the lack of oppor-
tunity caused by sex discrimination. 
It is clear, then, that the problem of employment discrimination 
is still very serious twenty years after the policy of racial neutrality 
was stated in Brown and ten years after the passage of title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In one sense this should not be sur-
prising-practices that have been in existence for two hundred years 
do not disappear easily. Discrimination has become engrained as 
a way of life in this country and, although much of the conscious dis-
crimination has ceased, the habitual, unconscious patterns of discrim-
ination remain with us today. White males still receive preferences 
in a number of positions, and minority persons and women still be-
lieve that there are many jobs for which they will not be given seri-
ous consideration. The "old boy" system of favoritism has worked 
well for years to keep white males in preferred job positions. 
The continued existence of long-standing myths about the inher-
ent inability of Blacks and women to perform certain work22 has con-
tributed to their exclusion from meaningful positions in the job mar-
ket. 23 Until recently, Blacks and women have not been accepted 
in the prestigious university graduate programs that serve as the 
training ground for many important professional jobs. In addition, 
cians. 
Among managers and proprietors, women frequently operate small retail es-
tablishments, while men may manage manufacturing plants or wholesale outlets. 
In the manufacturing of men's and boys' suits and coats, women are likely 
to be employed as hand finishers, thread trimmers and basting pullers, and sew-
ing machine operators-jobs where their average hourly earnings are less than 
$2.70-while men are likely to be employed as finish pressers (hand or 
machine), underpressers, cutters, and markers-with average hourly earnings of 
$3.50 to $4.25. 
In the service occupations, women are likely to be cooks, nurses' aides, and 
waitresses, while men are likely to be employed in higher paying jobs as bartend-
ers, guards, custodians, firemen, policemen, and detectives. 
Id. at 4. 
21. See, e.g., id. at 5 (Table, Median Salary of Full-Time Employed Civilian Sci-
entists, by Sex and Field, 1970). 
22. See Murphy, Sex Discrimination in Employment-Can We Legislate a Solu-
tion?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 437, 444 (1971). See generally M. GoLDSCHMID, BLACK AMER-
ICANS AND WHITE RACISM 138-86 (1970); RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THB UNITED 
STATES 137-283 (T. Pettigrew ed. 1975). 
23. See, e.g., Duncan, Patterns of Occupational Mobility Among Negro Men, in 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THB UNITED STATES, supra note 22, at 167; Johnson & 
Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 675, 738-41 (1971); Lieberson & Fuguitt, Negro-White Occupational Differ-
ences in the Absence of Discrimination, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN TIIB UNITED 
STATES, supra, at 187. See generally Ginzberg & Hiestand, Employment Patterns of 
Negro Men and Women, in THE AMERICAN NEGRO REFERENCE BOOK 205-50 (J. Da-
vis ed. 1966). 
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discriminatory employment tests have been used to perpetuate the 
. fable of white male superiority, and employer recruitment and train-
ing practices have been effectively used to screen out qualified 
Blacks and women from jobs in both the public and private sectors. 
These types of discriminatory practices will not be effectively de-
feated by neutral policies; progress under the color blindness concept 
has been slow and halting, defeating the promise of equal employ-
ment, opportunity made in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Given the 
evidence at hand, it is clear that some forms of preferential remedies 
that consider race and sex as factors in employment decisions are 
necessary to break the habit of employment discrimination.24 
This is not to say that Blacks or women must be thrust into posi-
tions for which they are not qualified. 25 However, when the choice 
is between qualified white males and other qualified individuals, we 
should open the available positions to those who formerly could not 
occupy them. Because of the overt preference historically shown 
for white males in the job market, this group has been conditioned 
to expect and receive a preference over qualified Blacks and women. 
This cycle can only be broken by reversing the preference temporar-
ily until people learn to work with completely neutral criteria. 
Several arguments can be put forward to support the claim that 
the use of preferential remedies is both illogical and unjust. First, 
it can be argued that regardless of the traditional preference shown 
white males in the job market, to now prefer Blacks and women un-
fairly "punishes" innocent white males for the misdeeds of their 
predecessors. Second, it can be contended that white male employ-
ees should not suffer in today's job market merely because certain 
employers were guilty of race and sex discrimination in the past. 
Finally, it has been argued that because the Blacks and women who 
may now benefit from job preferences are not the same individuals 
who were victims of discrimination in the past, they are being re-
warded for the wrongs done to their ancestors. 
These arguments, however, fail to place the preferential remedy 
in its proper perspective. For one thing, it should be noted that 
court-ordered or legislatively imposed preferential remedies are not 
nearly as widespread as the current debates over affirmative action 
might suggest. There are relatively few situations in which prefer-
ences have been mandated and effectively enforced, and in these 
24. See, e.g., NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); Morrow v. Cris-
ler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Blumrosen, supra note 2. 
25. In fact, the cases almost invariably note that only qualified minority persons 
or females may receive any preference in employment decisions. See, e.g., NAACP 
v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1974). 
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few situations the preferential remedies have been carefully circum-
scribed. 26 Furthermore, while there may be an element of unfair-
ness in the preferential remedy, some price must be paid to over-
come the long-standing and pervasive patterns of race and sex bias 
in this nation. The minor injustice that may result from the use of 
narrowly circumscribed preferential remedies is, on balance, out-
weighed by the fact that temporary preferential remedies appear to 
be the only way to effectively break the cycle of employment dis-
crimination and open all levels of the job market to all qualified ap-
plicants. 
The arguments against the use of preferential remedies also 
overlook an obvious but crucial factor-preferential remedies are 
designed to foster, not inhibit, equal employment opportunity. This 
characteristic distinguishes preferential remedies from the traditional 
overt discrimination in favor of white males; preferential remedies 
only temporarily favor one group in order to place all individuals on 
a par. This characteristic also obviates the apparent inconsistency 
in the argument that in order to end one preference (in favor of 
white males), other preferences (in favor of minorities and women) 
must be introduced. Preferential remedies granted to end employ-
ment discrimination may be likened to starting one controlled forest 
fire in order to bring a raging one under control. At first the idea 
may seem illogical, but the remedial principle is sound. And, of 
course, if the goal of equal employment opportunity is to be achieved 
then we must find remedies that work. 27 
In dealing with employment discrimination cases, the courts have 
begun to demonstrate a growing awareness that the goal of equal 
opportunity cannot be implemented effectively solely through neu-
tral employment practices. It would seem obvious that even if all 
employers hereafter hired on a nondiscriminatory basis, it would still 
be years before Blacks and women reached a status in the job mar-
ket comparable to that of white males. Thus, if the pattern of dis-
crimination is to be broken, the present effects of past discrimination 
must be eliminated. 28 In the context of public school desegregation, 
26. See R. SMITH, H. E.DwARDs & R. CLARK, LABOR R.m.AnoNs IN nm PUBLIC 
SEcI'OR 1179-81 (1974). 
27. Green·v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). Cf. Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th 
Cir. 1974). 
28. See, e.g., the figures cited in NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 621 (5th Cir. 
1974), on the effectiveness of quota relief in that case. The district court in NAACP 
v. Dothard, 7 BNA Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 129 (M.D. Ala. 1974), compared the prog-
ress in hiring Blacks in two cases, one of which used quotas and the other of which 
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the Supreme Court has noted that the courts must develop remedies 
that promise "realistically to work, and ... to work now."20 This 
dictum is equally applicable in the employment context; discrimina-
-tion simply must be ended in the most expeditious manner feasible. 30 
When a company, a government agency, or a union has discriminated 
against a segment of society for many years, a mere resolve to adopt 
neutral policies will not resolve the problem now. Some means .of 
bringing the discriminated-against group up to the level it would 
have been but for the discrimination must be employed. 31 
A number of different remedies have been authorized by Con-
gress and utilized by the courts to end employment discrimination. 
Injunctions have been issued against further discrimination82 and 
against strikes or other interferences with plans to end discrimina-
tion. 33 Additionally, courts have ordered employers to disseminate 
job information specifically aimed at the discriminated-against 
group, 34 keep detailed records to ensure nondiscriminatory hiring, 36 
hire and provide back pay for individuals who have been the victims 
of discrimination, 36 provide pre-test tutoring for job applicants, 37 ex-
pand apprenticeship and training programs, 38 and pay punitive dam-
ages. 38 Nevertheless, in certain cases it has been found that these 
denied quotas, and found that significant progress was made only when quotas were 
ordered. 
29. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968). Accord Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 13 (1971). 
30. See, e.g., NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); Morrow v. Cris-
ler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974). 
31. See Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 
F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969). 
32. See, e.g., Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 625 (2d Cir. 1974); 
NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Ironworkers 
Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 548 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971). 
33. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210, 220 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972). 
34. See, e.g., Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1974); United 
States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 377-78 (8th Cir. 1973); United States 
v. Ironworkers Local 86,443 F.2d 544,548 (9th Cir. 1971). 
35. See, e.g., Morrow v. Crisler, 479 F.2d 960, 967 (5th Cir. 1973); af fd. on 
rehearing, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 
F.2d 354, 3'80-82 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 
544, 548 (9th Cir. 1971). 
36. See, e.g., United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 548 (9th Cir. 
1971); Heat & Frost Insulators Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1053 (5th Cir. 
1969). 
37. See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 319 (8th Cir. 1971), modified 
on rehearing, 452 F.2d 327 (8th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). 
38. See, e.g., Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 627 (2d Cir. 1974); 
United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 552-54 (9th Cir. 1971). 
39. Plaintiffs have been permitted to seek punitive damages only in a few district 
court cases. See, e.g., Dessenberg v. American Metal Forming Co., 6 BNA Fair 
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remedies are often unsatisfactory methods of eliminating the effects 
of proscribed employment bias. In particular, a number of courts 
have held that some form of preferential remedy is the most effective 
means of enforcing equal employment opportunity when the facts 
show a long history of discrimination against a protected class. 40 
Remedial preferences have been used in a number of different 
ways. For example, courts have required employers to hire accord-
ing to ratios of minority to white employees. 41 The employer may 
be ordered to use the ratio until minority workers comprise a certain 
percentage of the total work force, 42 or the court may demand that 
the employer adhere to the ratio until he hires a certain number of 
minority workers.43 Another form of preferential remedy is fictional 
seniority, which provides less-senior minority workers protection 
against layoffs, or gives them preferences in promotions or transfers, 
by awarding them more seniority than they would have ordinarily 
accumulated under existing employment practices.44 In each in-
stance, the preferential remedy is by definition temporary and is 
used only until the discrimination pattern is broken. 
JI. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: 
THE PROBLEM OF REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 
Whether preferential remedies are constitutional is an issue that 
has not been fully resolved;45 moreover, few courts have analyzed 
Emp. Prac. Cas. 159 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Tooles v. Kellogg Co., 336 F. Supp. 14, 
18 (D. Neb. 1972). But see EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 
1975). 
40. See Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1974); 
NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1974); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 
F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal 
World: Equality for the Negra-The Problem of Special Treatment; 61 Nw. U. L 
RBV. 363 (1966). 
41. See, e.g., Erie Human Relations Commn. v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371, 373 (3d 
Cir. 1974); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1974); United States 
v. Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 412-13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 
(1973). 
42. See, e.g., NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 621 (5th Cir. 1974). 
43. See, e.g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civ. Serv. Commn., 482 
F.2d 1333, 1341 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 
377 (8th Cir. 1973). 
44. See Delay v. Carling Brewing Co., 10 BNA Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 164 (N.D. 
Ga. 1975); Watkins v. United States Steelworkers Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221 
(E.D. La. 1974), affd., 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975). Cf. Meadows v. Ford Motor 
Co., 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975). But see Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. 
!BEW Local 327, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works 
of Intl. Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974). See also Note, Last Hired, 
First Fired Layoffs and Title VII, 88 HARv. L. RBv. 1544, 1547-49 (1975). 
45. The Supreme Court declined to deal with the issue in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 
416 U.S. 312 (1974). DeFunis involved the constitutionality of preferential adtnis-
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the problem in a comprehensive fashion. Most courts that have ap-
proached the issue have merely cited the Supreme Court's dictum 
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education46 that 
"mathematical ratios" may serve as a "useful starting point in shap-
ing a remedy to correct past constitutional violations."47 These 
courts have generally been content to emphasize that preferential 
remedies are merely temporary48 and that, in the cases where they 
are utilized, they are the only realistic means of overcoming the ef-
fects of past discrimination.49 
This approach has certain advantages-it is concise, yet vague 
enough to permit the use of preferential remedies with a minimum 
of legal debate. However, one of the difficulties with this approach 
is that it is likely to provoke a hostile and often irrational "backlash" 
by those persons who are adversely affected by preferences in favor 
of Blacks and women. The attitudes and reactions of many mem-
bers of the academic community provide a good example of this phe-
nomenon. 50 Many minority persons and women perceive academe 
as a stronghold of racism and sexism, commanded by white males 
under the tattered banners of elitism and tradition. 51 This percep-
sions to Jaw school. The Court ruled that the issue was moot because DeFunis was 
graduating from Jaw school during the term when the opinion was rendered. 
46. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
47. 402 U.S. at 25. 
48. See Southern ru. Builder's Assn. v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 
1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 330 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 
U.S. 950 (1972); Local 53, Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1055 
(5th Cir. 1969). 
49. See Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638,501 F.2d 622, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1974). 
so. See H. LlvESEY, THE PROFESSORS-WHO THEY ARE, WHAT THEY Do, WHAT 
THEY REALLY WANT AND NEED 309-22 (1975). Although the reaction to "af-
firmative action" in academe is often hostile, it is nevertheless frequently without 
warrant because very little has been achieved pursuant to federally mandated affirm-
ative action plans. In a recent report issued by the United States Comptroller Gen-
eral, it was found that HEW has made but "minimal progress" in making sure that 
colleges and universities have acceptable affirmative action programs on employment 
and are in compliance with Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e (1970). The report reveals that, as of Dec. 9, 1974, only 29 colleges and 
universities had HEW-approved affirmative action programs. Between 1100 and 
1300 colleges and universities are subject to the program and most are required to 
have affirmative action plans. The report also indicates that HEW has not consist-
ently sent required "show-cause" notices to colleges and universities whose affirma-
tive action programs are found to be in noncompliance, "nor has it begun sanctions 
against these institutions." Government Employee Relations Rep. No. 621, at 
B-10, Sept. 1, 1975. 
51. This attitude of cynicism is hardly surprising, given situations like the recent 
one at The University of Michigan involving Dr. Jewel Cobb. See Washington Post, 
May 17, 1975, § 1, at 3, col. 1. Dr. Cobb, who has had a distinguished career as 
a teacher, research scholar, and university administrator, was tentatively selected by 
the Board of Regents of The University of Michigan to serve as Dean of the College 
of Literature, Science, and the Arts. However, within a few days after her selection, 
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tion is the result of the persistent exclusion of women and minorities 
from teaching and administrative positions at the university level. 
Some proponents of the existing system attempt to explain the fail-
ures of affirmative action and the failures of universities to hire 
minorities and women by claiming that very few "qualified" minority 
persons and women are available to fill the existing administrative 
and teaching positions in academe. Other individuals who oppose 
affirmative action argue that minorities and women are relatively un-
qualified (as compared with white males), and therefore no special 
effort should be made to place them in important jobs within the 
academic community. This latter view was appropriately criticized 
by commentators Moore and Wagstaff as follows: 
Philosopher Charles Frankel goes even further when he says ("Fac-
ulty Backlash," 1972, 127): "If you hire unqualified women 
[and ,by inference we ,think he also means minorities], bright white 
males don't get jobs." Maybe Frankel is right. However, many of 
those, like the authors, who challenge the rationale for such a state-
ment believe that ·Frankel would be on sounder ground if he offered 
evidence '1:o substantiate the reason for his concern. What is disturb-
ing is his chauvinism. Hiring unqualified persons of either sex and 
of any race would result in a number of bright white males, bright 
white females, and bright minorities of both sexes not getting as many 
of the available positions. Frankel, however, seems only concerned 
about "bright white males."52 
Affirmative action is neither an effort to lower the standards of 
excellence within the university community (or in any other job situ-
ation), nor an effort to promote a concept of "reverse discrimina.:. 
tion."53 Affirmative action is a simple and straight-forward commit-
ment to increase the number of minorities and women in jobs from 
which they have been formerly excluded. Affirmative action in gen-
eral, and preferential remedies in particular, can and does co-exist 
with the maintenance of professional standards in job hiring and re-
tention. Once this point is understood, certain legal and moral ques-
the Zoology Department, without ever having met Dr. Cobb, voted to deny her aca-
demic tenure. As a consequence, negotiations were broken off between Dr. Cobb 
and the University, and she was never officially app_ointed to the position. A com-
mittee of seven faculty persons and one professional administrator at The University 
of Michigan subsequen_tly investigated the situation and reported, in part, that the ten-
ure "procedures used to evaluate [Dr. Cobb] were manifestly inadequate." Affirma-
tive Action Comm., Academic Affairs Advisory Council, The University of Michi-
gan, Report on the LS&A Deanship Search, Selection, and Negotiations April 4, 
1974-Jan.31, 1975, at 32 (April 25, 1975). 
52. W. MOORE & L. WAGSTAFF, BLACK EDUCATORS IN WHITB CoLI.EGES 79 
(1974). 
53. This is true where "reverse discrimination" is used in a perjorative sense. 
The term is also used in a more neutral sense to mean all preferential remedies. 
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tions raised in connection with preferential remedies may become 
more manageable in the context of traditional constitutional analysis. 
Among the most difficult questions that must be answered in re-
ply to those who oppose preferential remedies on constitutional 
grounds are (1) under what circumstances should preferential rem-
edies be imposed, (2) by whom should such remedies be imposed, 
(3) for how long should such remedies be imposed, (4) what quality 
of evidence should be required to sustain the use of a preferential 
remedy, and (5) should the standard of scrutiny used to judge the 
constitutionality of the imposition of a preferential remedy be less 
stringent when the preference is legislatively, as opposed to judi-
cially, mandated. Unfortunately, the courts to date have done little 
to respond to these issues; rather, the judicial opinions dealing with 
preferential remedies appear to have taken a strictly result-oriented 
approach. 54 These opinions have often become mired in traditional 
constitutional jargon, seemingly in order to reconcile or distinguish 
prior holdings of the Supreme Court, and thus frequently obscure 
the truly difficult and significant issues raised by preferential reme-
dies. As a consequence, no uniform legal principles or policy imper-
atives have emerged to lend some enlightened consistency and co-
herence to these opinions. However, while there is no clear pattern 
to the judicial opinions, it is still possible to analyze some of the cur-
rent judicial thinking and predict the general direction in which the 
courts appear to be heading in the area of preferential remedies. 
Although it is clear that racial classifications are not unconstitu-
tional per se, 115 they traditionally have been considered suspect and 
are generally subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.156 This means that 
if the government wishes to employ a racially based preference, it 
must demonstrate that this preference serves a compelling govern-
mental interest and that its use is the least drastic means of accom-
plishing the desired end. As a practical matter, and as a general 
54. See, e.g., United States v. Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1973); 
United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971). 
55. E.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Lov-
ing v. Virginia, 388 U.S. J, 11 (1967); Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254, 1257 (3d 
Cir. 1970). 
56. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). Sex is apparently not a suspect 
classification, Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 509 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 
U.S. 351, 355 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973) (Powell, 
J., concurring), although at least four Justices would treat it as suspect. See Schles-
inger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 511 (1915) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). At present, therefore, preferences involving sex 
classifications may only have to pass the rational basis test. See, e.g. Kahn v. 
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). Cf. Feinerman v. Jones, 356 F. Supp. 252 '(M.D. Pa. 
1973). 
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proposition, it may be assumed that any remedy that seeks to achieve 
equal employment opportunity among persons of different races will 
always serve a compelling governmental interest. 57 However, it is 
more difficult to show that there are no less drastic alternative rem-
edies that would break the cycle of discrimination. Although a few 
courts have denied preferential remedies on the ground that there 
are less drastic means of ending employment discrimination, 58 sev-
eral courts have implicitly found that some form of preferential rem-
edy is necessary to eliminate the effects of past discrimination, 59 and 
at least one court has explicitly stated this conclusion. 60 
In NAACP v. Allen,61 the Fifth Circuit used statistics to demon-
strate that a neutral remedy alone was not sufficient to end discrim-
ination. The court noted that an injunction against further race dis-
crimination issued to the Alabama Department of Public Safety had 
not resulted in the hiring of a single black state trooper; indeed, the 
court found that it was not until the district court ordered preferential 
relief, some eighteen months after the original injunction was 
ordered, that Blacks were finally hired. 62 The court also noted that, 
aside from the obvious effect of providing jobs for black applicants, 
the preferential remedy "promptly operates to change the outward 
and visible signs of yesterday's racial distinctions and thus, to pro-
vide an impetus to the process of dismantling the barriers, psycholog-
ical or otherwise, erected by past practices."63 The court thus recog-
nized that breaking both those who discriminate and those who ex-
pect to be discriminated against of the "habit'' of racial discrimina-
tion is an integral part of the task of ending employment discrimina-
tion and that some form of preferential remedy is necessary to break 
the discrimination cycle. Similar reasoning will hold true in most 
cases where there is a long history of discrimination; in these cases 
a preferential remedy should be able to survive strict judicial scrutiny. 
51. See, e.g., Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970) (goal of equal op-
portunity so compelling that school board may not only be permitted, but may be 
required, to prefer Blacks in hiring). 
58. See, e.g., Harper v. Mayor & City Council, 359 F. Supp. 1187, 1214 (D. Md.), 
affd. sub nom. Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134; 1136 (4th Cir. 1973); Ar-
rington v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 306 F. Supp. 1355, 1359-60 (D. Mass. 
1969). 
59. See Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1974); 
NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1974); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 
F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1974). 
60. NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1974). 
61. 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974). 
62. 493 F.2d at 621. 
63. 493 F.2d at 621. 
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It can be argued, however, that preferential remedies involving 
racial or gender-based classifications should be subjected to the less 
rigid rational basis test, rather than to strict scrutiny. 64 There are 
two related arguments that support this proposal. First, it can be 
contended that the strict scrutiny approach was judicially developed 
to prevent only those classifications that stigmatize some segment of 
society. Although most government classifications tend to favor one 
group over another, they are generally used to further neutral poli-
cies of convenience or necessity; they do not intend to stigmatize 
the disfavored group and they do not have that effect. In such cases, 
the government need only show that there is some rational basis for 
the classification. Certain classifications, however, tend to have no 
legitimate public purpose and involve groups that have traditionally 
been disadvantaged in our society. If this is the case, a suspicion 
is raised that the classification is based on the same irrational 
prejudices that caused the group to be disfavored in the past; accord-
ingly, the classification should be strictly scrutinized. However, 
when the classification is benign, favoring an historically disadvan-
taged group, the suspicion of irrational prejudice against the group 
is not present;65 therefore, the argument concludes, there is no need 
to strictly scrutinize such a classification. 
Professor Ely has suggested a second and related argument for 
applying the rational basis test to benign classifications. 66 When the 
dominant group in the legislature acts to its own benefit while dis-
advantaging a disfavored minority, the classification is suspect and 
should be strictly scrutinized. However, when the dominant group 
acts to its own detriment while benefiting a minority, the classifica-
tion is not suspect and need have only a rational basis. Thus, ac-
cording to Professor Ely, when a white legislature approves a prefer-
ence that works to the advantage of Blacks and to the detriment of 
Whites, there has been no "suspicious" act. It is unlikely that the 
dominant group would disadvantage itself in relation to a non-
dominant group because of any of the irrational reasons that his-
64. See, e.g., Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. 
CHI. L. R.Ev. 723 (1974); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. 
REV. 1065, 1107-08 (1969) [hereinafter Developments]. 
65. The argument is that only those classifications that stigmatize a class should 
be suspect. However, it can be argued that even a preference in favor of Blacks stig-
matizes them by implying that they could not "make it" without such assistance. See, 
e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). For 
a similar argument with respect to women, see Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitu-
tion, 44 U. CIN. L. R.Ev. 1, 16-23 (1975). 
66. Ely, supra note 64. See also Developments, supra note 64, at 1125-26. 
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torically led to discrimination against the minority.67 Similarly, the 
dominant group is almost certain to choose the least drastic (to it-
self) means of benefiting the disadvantaged group. These built-in 
safeguards abrogate the need for strict scrutiny, and the rational basis 
test provides sufficient assurance of fair treatment for all. 68 
It appears that the courts may in fact be distinguishing between 
those preferences mandated by the legislature and those ordered by 
the courts and scrutinizing benign preferences less strictly when they 
originate in the legislature. It may be that the courts find it easier 
to accept the use of legislatively authorized preferential remedies be-
cause, unlike the judiciary, the legislature is directly accountable to 
the voters, who can show their disapproval at the ballot box. While 
the exact rationale being utilized is unclear, the opinions do suggest 
that something similar to a rational basis test is being applied to be-
nign preferences that have been mandated by the legislature, while 
stricter scrutiny is applied when there is no clear legislative mandate. 
In Kahn v. Shevin69 the Supreme Court held that a Florida stat-
ute that provided a property tax exemption to widows, but offered 
no analogous benefit to widowers, did not violate the equal protec-
tion clause. The Court did not consider whether a compelling state 
interest was present or less drastic means possible; it required only 
a rational basis for the preference. In part, it found this basis by 
reasoning that because "the job market is inhospitable to the woman 
seeking any but the lowest paid jobs,"70 the state may pass a tax law 
"reasonably designed to further the state policy of cushioning the fi-
nancial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for which that loss im-
poses a disproportionately heavy burden."71 
It could be argued that the rational basis test was applied in Kahn 
because sex has not yet been declared a suspect classification by a 
majority of the Supreme Court, and therefore that the case is not 
a statement about the proper standard for benign preferences. 
However, the majority opinion was written by Justice Douglas, who 
concurred in the plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson;12 the 
plurality in Frontiero found that sex was a suspect classification. This 
67. Ely, supra note 64, at 735. 
68. If the rational basis test is applied to benign preferences, they should easily 
pass constitutional muster since the elimination of the effects of discrimination is cer-
tainly a valid governmental interest that benign preferences would conceivably fur-
ther. 
69. 416 U.S. 351 (1974). 
70. 416 U.S. at 353. 
71. 416 U.S. at 355. 
72. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
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seems to indicate that at least Justice Douglas is willing to use the 
rational basis test in considering legislatively declared benign prefer-
ences involving otherwise-suspect classifications. 73 The three dis-
senting Justices in Kahn (Brennan, Marshall, and White) would 
seemingly require strict scrutiny even for benign preferences. Pur-
suant to this view, they argued in Kahn that the state could ease 
the financial impact of spousal loss without discriminating between 
men and women.74 
Kahn may have been narrowed recently by the Court's opinion 
in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld.75 In Wiesenfeld, the Court found that 
the mother's insurance benefits section of the Social Security Act, 76 
which provided benefits to the widow of a worker with eligible chil-
dren in her care but made no corresponding provision for a similarly 
situated widower, unjustifiably discriminated against female wage 
earners by providing their survivors with less protection than the sur-
vivors of male wage earners. The government had argued that the 
scheme was "designed to compensate women beneficiaries as a 
group for the economic difficulties which still confront women who 
seek to support themselves and their families."77 However, the 
Court noted that "the mere recitation of a benign, compensatory pur-
pose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry 
into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme."78 The 
Court found that in this case the scheme was not based on any spe-
cial needs of women, but on the premise that women, unlike men, 
would want to remain at home with their minor children. The Court 
found this premise to be entirely irrational, since either parent might 
want to remain at home upon the other's death. 
As in Kahn, the challenged statutory scheme drew a sex-based 
line, allowing widows a benefit not available to widowers. Yet in 
Wiesenfeld, the Court held that the statutory preference could not 
meet the rational basis test. This holding may indicate that the 
Court intends in the future to scrutinize preferences for women more 
carefully. However, the Court may simply have decided that the 
73. This interpretation finds support in the means by which Justice Douglas dis-
tinguished Kahn from Frontiero. Unlike the statutes in Kahn, Justice Douglas found 
that the legislation in Frontiero was "not in any sense designed to rectify the effects 
of past discrimination against women." 416 U.S. at 355 n.8, quoting Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 n.22 (1973). 
74. 416 U.S. at 357-60 (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting); 416 U.S. at 360-62 
(White, J., dissenting). 
75. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
76. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1972). 
77. 420 U.S. at 648. 
78. 420 U.S. at 648. 
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classification in Wiesenfeld was not an attempt to aid women disad-
vantaged in the working world, but represented a perpetuation of 
the myth that women want to stay home with their children while 
men want to work. If the Court in Wiesenfeld was concerned with 
the legislative use of stereotypes, it failed to point out why the basis 
of the preference for widows in Kahn was more justifiable than that 
in Wiesenfeld. However, the type of preference at issue in both 
cases was very different from those preferences at issue in the em-
ployment cases. Preferential remedies in the employment area al-
low minority members and women to work and support themselves 
while the preferences at issue in Kahn and Wiesenfeld reinforced 
the image of women as the weaker sex. Thus, it is likely that some 
proponents of remedial preferences in employment discrimination 
cases will oppose the preferences in Kahn and Wiesenfeld. This 
opposition, however, goes to the issue whether a preference is ac-
tually benign rather than whether benign preferences should be per-
mitted. A preference that has the effect of stigmatizing a class of 
people by suggesting that they are incapable of caring for themselves 
may not be benign. 79 
In both Kahn and Wiesenfeld, the standard of review used to 
determine both whether the preference at issue was benign, and 
whether it should be permitted was the rational basis test. so In Mor-
ton v. Mancari,81 the Court also seemed to accept the rational basis 
test for a benign legislative preference where Indians were the pre-
ferred class. In Morton, the Court unanimously upheld the Indian 
Preference Statute82 which provides a preference for Indians seeking 
employment with the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The Court found 
that because the preference was "reasonably designed to further the 
cause of Indian self-government and make the BIA more responsive 
to the needs of its constituent groups," it was "reasonably and di-
rectly related to a legitimate, nonracially based goal."88 Although 
19. See note 65 supra. 
80. While the Court appeared to use the rational basis test throughout both Kahn 
and Wiesenfeld, it is not clear that this is the only approach it could have used. A 
court might want to use more than a mere rationality test when determining whether 
a preference was actually, as opposed to "conceivably,'' benign. Thus, a statute that 
appears benign under the rational basis test might tum out to have invidious aspects 
under stricter scrutiny. See, e.g., Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & 
Welfare, 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.NJ. 1973). This raises a fascinating question about 
the proper initial approach to "benign" legislation that unfortunately is beyond the 
scope of this article. 
81. 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
82, Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1970), 
83, 417 U.S. at 554. 
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the Court may have considered the preference nonracially based in 
the sense that it encouraged long-run equality, it was clearly racially 
based in the sense that Indians were preferred for employment with 
the BIA solely because they were Indians. 
In considering the Indian preference, the Court did not require 
a showing of compelling governmental interest and, although it noted 
that the statute was narrowly drawn to include in the preferred class 
only those Indians affected by the BIA (that is, those living on or 
near reservations), it did not consider whether there were less dras-
tic means of promoting Indian self-government. This could be at-
tributable in part to the Court's reliance on two clauses of the Consti-
tution that seem to single Indians out for special treatment;84 how-
ever, it appears that the Court was also influenced by the fact that 
it was dealing with a benign preference, aiding a minority group that 
historically had been discriminated against. 
The rational basis test has also been used in considering the con-
stitutionality of statutes mandating preferences for veterans. These 
statutes generally grant persons extra points on competitive civil 
service exams solely because -they are veterans.85 In Feinerman v. 
Jones,86 the district court held that because there is no fundamental 
right "to be fairly considered for public employment,"87 the state 
may prefer veterans so long as there is a rational basis for the pref-
erence. The court postulated three factors that support this rational 
basis: military training makes veterans more disciplined, loyal, and 
experienced; veterans should be rewarded for serving in the military; 
and the preference aids in rehabilitating and relocating veterans 
whose lives were disrupted by military service. Because the plaintiff 
failed to prove any discriminatory impact, the court rejected the 
claim that the preference discriminated against women. Further-
more, the court stated that even if there was such a discriminatory 
impact, the statute would still be constitutional because a rational 
basis for the preference existed. 
Finally, in Porcelli v. Titus,88 the Third Circuit used a rational 
basis test to uphold the abolition of a promotional list being used 
by the Newark School Board that tended to perpetuate the low rep-
resentation of Blacks among school administrators. In order to in-
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (power to "regulate Commerce .•. with the 
Indian Tribes"); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (power to make treaties). 
85. See, e.g., N.Y. Crv. SERv. LAw § 85 (McKinney 1973); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 38.413 (1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 492.3 (Purdon 1969). 
86. 356 F. Supp. 252 (M.D. Pa. 1973). 
87. 356 F. Supp. at258. 
88. 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970). 
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crease the number of Blacks who could be selected as principals or 
vice-principals, the court approved the use of race as one criterion 
to be used in the selection process. In fact, the court not only found 
that the school board was permitted to prefer minority applicants, 
but indicated that the board may have had an affirmative duty to 
do so in order to integrate school faculties.89 
In each of these cases involving the use of legislatively authorized 
preferential treatment, the courts seemed content merely to rubber-
stamp what they perceived as benign legislative action;90 there was 
little or no consideration of the existence of a compelling state inter-
est or a less drastic means. The courts have not required that the 
preferences be limited to the end of correcting the effects of past 
discrimination, and thus no time limits or goals have been mentioned 
that would make the preferences temporary. It appears, therefore, 
that the courts may be willing to accept the principle that benign 
racial or gender-based classifications, when directly ordered by a leg-
islative body, are not suspect and need not be strictly scrutinized. 
There is a hybrid class of preference cases, a cross between legis-
latively ordered and court ordered preferences, in which either an 
administrative agency or a court orders a remedial preference on the 
basis of an implied legislative authorization. For example, under 
Executive Order 11246,91 the Secretary of Labor is authorized to 
promulgate programs that, as a condition for receiving government 
contracts, require government contractors to undertake affirmative 
action to ensure nondiscriminatory employment. One such program, 
the "Philadelphia Plan," required federal contractors to make good 
faith efforts to meet specific goals for minority employment in six 
construction trades and had the effect of preferring minority appli-
cants over white males. The "Philadelphia Plan" was approved in 
Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of 
89. 431 F.2d at 1257-58. 
90. But see Anderson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist, 357 F. Supp. 248 
(N.D. Cal. 1972), where the court overturned a school board's policy of preferring 
minority applicants. 
91. 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). See Associated Gen. Con-
tractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 
U.S. 957 (1974); Southern Ill. Builders Assn. v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 
1972); Contractors Assn. of Eastern Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d 
Cir. 1971). The President is likely to be somewhat less responsive to the public will 
than the legislature and somewhat more responsive than the courts. Unlike individual 
legislators, the President's constituency is generally very broad and is not likely to 
leave him over an individual issue. This gives him more flexibility than the legisla-
ture. However, unlike federal judges, the President is elected and must still consider 
the wishes of his constituents to some extent Thus, the Executive Order cases seem 
to fall somewhere between pure legislative and pure judicial preferences. 
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Labor.92 The court in Contractors emphasized that the plan care-
fully considered employment trends and industry needs in order to 
interfere as little as possible with nonminority workers. 93 In addi-
tion, the court noted that the plan was designed only to implement 
the participation of minority tradespeople in the construction labor 
pool and was shaped to meet the specific problems of the affected 
area; thus, it implied that it felt the preference would cease as soon 
as these goals were reached. 94 
In taking into account the employment needs in the industry and 
the temporary nature of the preference, the Contractors court 
seemed to indicate that the plan was as narrowly drawn as possible. 
However, because the court did not consider whether there was a 
less drastic alternative than a preference that would achieve equal 
opportunity, it can be inferred that the court was scrutinizing the 
preference less strictly than is done in suspect classification cases. 
Nevertheless, the scrutiny applied was stricter than in the benign leg-
islative preference cases. 
This strict-but-not-too-strict level of scrutiny is also apparent in 
the Washington supreme court's analysis in DeFunis v. Odegaard.oil 
In that case, the court upheld the University of Washington's prefer-
ential admissions program under which minority applicants received 
some preference over Whites. The court rejected the argument that 
because the racial classification was benign, the rational basis stand-
ard of scrutiny should be applied. In its view, because of the dispar-
ate effect such classification had on nonminority applicants, a more 
rigid standard of scrutiny was required.96 Using what it considered 
strict scrutiny, the court found that a compelling state interest was 
served by integrating law schools, acquainting law students with all 
segments of society, and increasing the number of minority lawyers. 
Furthermore, the court found that a preference for minority students 
was the least drastic means of achieving integration in the law 
school.97 However, it is significant that the court failed to mention 
whether the preferential remedy was limited-that is, whether it 
would automatically end when the problem ended. The court also 
92. 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971). 
93. 442 F.2d at 176-77. But see Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), where 
the Court approved a legislative preference that was seemingly broader than neces-
sary to accomplish the desired goal. 
94. 442 F.2d at 176-77. 
95. 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as moot, 416 U.S. 312 
(1974). 
96. 82 Wash. 2d at 32,507 P.2d at 1182. 
97. 82 Wash. 2d at 32-35, 507 P.2d at 1182-84. 
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failed to make a finding that the law school had historically discrimi-
nated against minorities. Because these two factors are generally 
considered in court-ordered preference cases, 98 the failure to take 
them into account in DeFunis may indicate that the level of scrutiny 
was somewhat less rigid. 
The less rigid standard of scrutiny applied by the Washington su-
preme court would seem to be appropriate in a case like DeFunis. 
Some legislative approval of the preferential admissions policy can 
be inferred from the fact that the legislature continued to appropriate 
funds without questioning the policy. Furthermore, professional 
schools may be in a better position than either legislatures or courts 
to make judgments about preferential admissions programs. The 
legislature, as a political body, may find the issue too complex and 
politically sensitive to handle efficiently, while the courts have 
neither the time nor the expertise to second-guess each admissions 
decision. In addition, since there are no objective tests that have 
been shown to measure perfectly a student's potential performance 
in law school or practice, the school ought to be allowed some m~-
gin for experimentation in its admissions policy, particularly when 
a legitimate social end (such as the training of more minority and 
women attorneys) is being served. Finally, the school should be 
given some leeway in determining the goals of its admissions policy. 
For example, some law schools might choose students based on their 
potential for becoming outstanding legal scholars, while other schobls 
might value more highly the potential for becoming a successful local 
practitioner; similarly some schools might prefer foreign over Ameri-
can applicants in selecting persons for graduate law study or graduat(? 
fellowships. Few people have questioned the advisability of allow-
ing law schools leeway in deciding such questions, even though a 
class of potential students might be excluded by the policies adopted. 
Thus, if the school perceives a need to bring more minority or 
women students into the profession, it is at least arguable that it 
should be permitted to do so. 
It can be legitimately contended that if too much discretion is 
given to nonlegislative agencies such as law schools, these agencies 
may be able to employ malign as well as benign preferences. This 
can be prevented, however, by requiring the agency to justify its 
"hiring" goals as was done in DeFunis. In other words, although 
the agency should be allowed considerable discretion, it would of 
course be limited by statutory or constitutional constraints against in-
vidious discrimination. • 
98. See text at notes 164-66, 178 i,cfra. 
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When DeFunis reached the Supreme Court, the Court found the 
case to be moot and refused to rule on the controversial prefer-
ence. 99 Justice Douglas dissented from the finding of mootness and 
indicated that, although he would be willing to give school officials 
considerable discretion in admissions decisions, he would not uphold 
a policy that gave some applicants a preference based solely on their 
race. Justice Douglas called for a very strict standard of review and 
implied that he would not favor preferential treatment for minority 
applicants. 
Justice Douglas' dissent in DeFunis wou1d seem to clash directly 
with his opinion in Kahn v. Shevin. Although Douglas did not at-
tempt to reconcile the opinions, 100 two factors may have influenced 
the conflicting results. First, in Kahn there was a clear legislative 
mandate for the preference, while in DeFunis the mandate was more 
vague and uncertain. Justice Douglas may have been more willing 
to defer to the judgment of a legislature than the decisions of a quasi-
administrative body. Second, and probably more persuasive, in De-
Funis the preference was benign toward minority applicants but it 
was malign toward white applicants-white applicants were directly 
and adversely affected by the preference. In Kahn, however, any 
adverse effect on males was less direct, and in fact, the burden of 
the preference was spread over most of the taxpaying population of 
the state, both male and female. Justice Douglas thus may have 
been willing to allow a preference only when no clearly defined 
group is directly and adversely affected by the benefit granted to the 
preferred group.101 
This reasoning, however, would seem to conflict with the Su-
preme Court's decision in Morton v. Mancari. In that case, non-
Indian applicants were directly disadvantaged by the Indian prefer-
ence. The Court's reliance, at least in part, on those sections of the 
Constitution that seem to give Indians some special status may ac-
count for Justice Douglas' different attitude toward the preference 
in Morton. Nevertheless, these conflicting decisions seem to indi-
cate that Justice Douglas would have strictly scrutinized a preference 
that is not mandated by the legislature and that adversely affects a 
99. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). DeFunis was admitted to law 
school pursuant to the order of the trial court, which had found in his favor. Since 
the parties had agreed that regardless of the outcome of the case DeFunis would be 
allowed to graduate, the Court found the case to be moot. 316 U.S. at 316-20. 
100. DeFunis was decided on April 23, 1974. 416 U.S. at 312. Kahn was de-
cided the following day. 416 U.S. at 351. 
101. Compare Wiesenfeld, where one group of women (those working and mak-
ing Social Security payments) were directly and adversely affected by a preference 
designed to compensate another group of women. See text at notes 75-78 supra. 
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particular group, while he would have been more likely to use the 
rational basis test in cases involving a legislatively mandated prefer-
ence, especially if the preference spreads any accompanying burden 
widely over the population. 
The strictest judicial scrutiny seems to be applied in cases in 
which the courts order preferences without any explicit legislative 
mandate. For example, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board 
of Education, 102 the Court held that "mathematical ratios" are "use-
ful starting point[s] in shaping a remedy"103 for unconstitutional 
segregation of students and faculty in a school district. However, 
the Court noted that the use of ratios is not to be ordered lightly, 
and that here the district court had found both a history of segrega-
tion and failure by the school board to propose workable alternative 
means of integrating the schools.10{ The Court emphasized that the 
ratio is only a starting point and that there is no constitutional right 
to a fixed racial balance in every school equal to that in the school 
system as a whole.105 
The Swann case is only one in a long line of cases seeking to 
enforce the constitutional right to attend integrated schools.106 Al-
though state-imposed school segregation was declared unconstitu-
tional almost seventeen years before Swann, deliberate resistance on 
the part of many school boards impeded the effort to enforce the 
constitutional guarantee.107 The Court realized in Swann that color-
blind remedies could not effectively eliminate segregation and that 
affirmative relief was necessary. When a school board defaults on 
its obligation to integrate the schools, the courts have a duty to order 
such relief (including that based on ratios) as is necessary to end 
the pattern of segregation. 
The Court approved the use of ratios in faculty assignments in 
United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education,1°8 in 
which the Court recognized that the ratios would be necessary in 
order to assure that faculties would be integrated with the greatest 
possible speed. While this case did not involve hiring and firing, 
it nevertheless involved the use of color in the employment-related 
102. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
103. 402 U.S. at 25. 
104. 402 U.S. at 24. 
105. 402 U.S. at 23-24. 
106. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 
228 (1969). 
107. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 
228 (1969). 
108. 395 U.S. 225 (1969). 
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decision concerning where the teachers' work would be done. It 
therefore forms a bridge between the school desegregation and em-
ployment cases. 
In the school desegregation cases, both the compelling govern-
mental interest in integration and the absence of workable, less dras-
tic means are well documented, making it easy for the Supreme 
Court to apply strict scrutiny to desegregation orders and yet allow 
the lower courts a great deal of discretion.109 Court-ordered prefer-
ential remedies in the absence of explicit legislative mandate have 
also been used in the employment context under the Civil Rights 
Acts of 1866110 and 1871,111 but the strict scrutiny applied in these 
cases requires an individual finding that a compelling governmental 
interest is served and no less drastic means are available. For in-
stance, in NAACP v. Allen, the court approved a one-Black-to-one-
White hiring ratio to be in effect until twenty-five per cent of the 
Alabama state troopers and support personnel were Black. Al-
though the court appeared willing to assume that there was a compel-
ling governmental interest in providing equal opportunity to be hired 
for these jobs, 112 it emphasized that there was no less restrictive 
means of achieving the goal and stressed that by making the order 
temporary, the district court had imposed the most narrowly drawn 
remedy possible to accomplish the purpose.118 
These decisions suggest that there may be a continuum in the 
level of scrutiny accorded a preferential remedy that depends on the 
degree of legislative approval of that remedy. Scrutiny seems to be 
most lenient when there is an explicit legislative mandate. When 
the mandate is only implied, the scrutiny is more strict, and it intensi-
fies as the implication becomes less clear. The strictest scrutiny is 
applied when there is not even an implied legislative mandate. This 
strictness manifests itself in the degree to which the courts require 
a consideration of both alternative means and limits on the duration 
of the remedy. In the employment context, where there are at most 
only implied legislative mandates for preferential remedies, this 
means that to withstand constitutional attack, a preferential remedy 
must be found to be the least drastic means of remedying discrimina-
109. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 11-12 
(1971); United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 226 
(1969). 
110. 42 u.s.c. § 1981 (1970). 
111. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1970). 
112. The defendants had, however, objected on appeal only to the affirmative 
remedy, not to the finding of a duty not to discriminate. See 493 F.2d at 617. 
113. 493 F.2d at 621. 
November 1975] Preferential Remedies 25 
tion in the particular situation, must be drawn narrowly enough to 
limit its effect to remedying past discrimination, and must automat-
ically terminate when the goal is accomplished. These limitations 
assure that the volatile remedy will be used sparingly.114 Since only 
carefully circumscribed preferences are likely to receive judicial ap-
proval, the furor over preferential remedies in the employment con-
text is based on a misconception of the power and inclination of the 
courts to so affect the employment relationship. 
ill. THE Ex!STING LEGISLATION ON EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964115 makes it an unlawful 
employment practice to discriminate against any individual on the 
basis of the individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin.116 When a violation of the Act is found, the district court may, 
inter alia, "order such affirmative action . • • or any other equitable 
relief as the court deems appropriate."117 However, section 703G) 
of the Act forbids the use of preferential treatment to remedy an 
imbalance between minority and nonminority employees.U8 
Notwithstanding section 703G), a number of courts have found 
that preferential treatment may be an acceptable remedy for a viola-
tion of title VII when there is a history of discrimination, whether 
the discrimination was intentional119 or de facto.120 While some of 
114. There are good reasons why the use of racial criteria should be strictly 
scrutinized and given legal sanction only where a compelling need for remedial 
action can be shown. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 
920, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1969). Government recognition and sanction of racial 
classifications may be inherently divisive, reinforcing prejudices, confirming per-
ceived differences between the races, and weakening the government's educative 
role on behalf of equality and neutrality. It may ali1,o have unexpected results, 
such as the development of indicia for placing individuals into different racial 
categories. Once racial classifications are imbedded in the law, their purpose 
may become perverted: a benign preference under certain con'iiitions may shade 
into a malignant preference at other times. Moreover, a -racial preference for 
members of one minority might result in discrimination against another minor-
ity, a higher proportion of whose members bad previously enjoyed access to a 
certain opportunity. 
Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9, 17-18 (1st Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974). 
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to -17 (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973 ). 
116. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-2 (1970). 
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. III, 1973). 
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970). 
119. See, e.g., United States v. Masonry Contractors Assn. of Memphis, Inc., 497 
F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1974); Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 
1974); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); United 
States v. Lathers Local 46,471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. lronwork-
ers Local 86,443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971). 
120. See, e.g., NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1028 (1st Cir. 1974); United 
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these opinions fail to mention section 703(j), 121 others reason that 
the section was not intended to prohibit the use of a preferential 
remedy where an imbalance is a result of past unlawful discrimina-
tion. This is so, say these courts, since it "would allow complete 
nullification" of the statute to eliminate as a possible remedy what 
is often the only effective means of overcoming past discrimina-
tion.122 
Thus far, it appears that only two courts of appeals have ap-
proved actual hiring preferences for minority employees under title 
VII. Finding a history of discrimination in the promotion of fore-
men, the court in United States v. N. L. Industries, Inc.,123 ordered 
a one-Black-to-one-White hiring ratio until fifteen Blacks (out of one 
hundred positions) were promoted. However, the court rejected a 
government request for a recruiting campaign designed to effect a 
goal of one-third black hires into office, clerical, and technical posi-
tions notwithstanding that there was a history of discrimination in 
that area. Similarly, in EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co.,124 the court 
upheld the use of hiring ratios where the district court had found 
a long history of discrimination against black job applicants and em-
ployees by both the company and the unions involved. The other 
decisions by courts of appeals under title VII in which preferences 
have been ordered have usually involved preferences for union 
membership or referrals.125 -However, these may be tantamount to 
job preferences since employers in certain private industries give 
preference to union members over nonmembers in hiring and place-
ment.126 
States v. IBEW Local 212,472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Carpenters 
Local 169, 457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. !BEW Local 38, 428 F.2d 
144 (6th Cir. 1970); Local 53, Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 
(5th Cir. 1969). 
121. E.g., EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975); United 
States v. Masonry Contractors Assn., 498 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1974); United States 
v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Carpenters 
Local 169,457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1972). 
122. See Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 631 (2d Cir. 1974); 
United States v. Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 413 (2d Cir. 1973); United States 
v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 552-54 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. 
IBEW Local 38, 428 F.2d 144, 149-50 (6th Cir. 1970); Local 53, Heat & Frost In-
sulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1054 (5th Cir. 1969). 
123. 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973). 
124. 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975). 
125. See cases cited in notes 119-20 supra. 
126. See United States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210, 219 (7th Cir. 
1972) ("Where, as here, the union members refuse to work with nonmembers who 
are working without union approval, the union in fact exerts effective control over 
employment in the trade by controlling membership and issuance of permits, notwith-
standing contractual provisions purportedly permitting employment without regard for 
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Notwithstanding section 703G), there is an implied legislative 
mandate for the use of preferential remedies under title VII. Sec-
tion 703G) was added to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a compro-
mise measure to emphasize that the Act would not require employers 
to achieve or maintain specific racial balances through the use of 
preferential treatment. However, at no point in the consideration 
of the Act did the sponsors indicate that temporary preferential rem-
edies could not be used to overcome the effects of past discrimina-
tion.127 In considering the 1972 amendments to the Act, Congress 
impliedly recognized the importance of preferential ,remedies by re-
jecting a number of proposed amendments that would have elim-
inated their use. Senator J avits, one of the sponsors of the bill, in 
arguing against an amendment that would have enjoined all federal 
officials from requiring preferential remedies, pointed out that the 
amendment would not only eliminate an important judicial remedy 
for employment discrimination, but would also preclude effective 
consent decrees and affirmative action under Executive Order 
11246.128 The Senate rejected the proposed amendment, thereby 
implying its approval of preferential remedies as employed by the 
courts.129 
Despite this implied legislative approval, the courts have contin-
ued to subject preferential remedies in title VII cases to very strict 
judicial scrutiny,180 similar to that applied in the court-ordered pref-
erence cases.181 This can be attributed to two factors. First, al-
though section 703G) has not been interpreted to ban all preferen-
tial remedies, 182 the section may indicate that Congress was con-
cerned about the possibility of abuse of such remedies; therefore 
union membership or approval"); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 
544, 547 (9th Cir. 1971); Local 53, Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 
1047, 1049 (5th Cir. 1969). 
127. The sponsors did indicate that title VII would not require the maintenance 
of a racial balance, see, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 12,723 (1964) (remarks of Senator 
Humphrey); 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964) (memorandum by Senators Clark and 
Case), but that is quite different from a temporary preferential remedy used solely 
to overcome the effects of past discrimination. 
128. See 118 CONG. REc. 1664 (1972). See also 118 CONG. REC. 1661-76 
(1972); 118 CONG. REc. 4917-18 (1972). 
129. Since Congress specifically considered the issue of preferential treatment and 
refused to eliminate its use as a remedy under title VII, the refusal is at least some 
evidence of its approval of court interpretations. See Laycock v. Kenney, 270 F.2d 
580 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 933 (1960). Cf. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 
U.S. 258 (1972). 
130. See, e.g., Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); 
United States v. Lathers Local 46,471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1973). 
131. See text at notes 45-114 supra. 
132. See text at notes 119-22 supra. 
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courts may feel that they should not be ordered lightly. Second, 
Congress has neither affirmatively approved such remedies nor de-
fined the situations in which it might consider their use proper. 
Preferential treatment is a volatile remedy, and without any specific 
guidance from the legislature, it is reasonable that the courts would 
carefully limit the use of these remedies under title VII. 
Employment discrimination is also proscribed by the Civil Rights 
Acts of 1866183 and 1871.134 The Civil Rights Act of 1866, now 
42 U.S.C. § 1981, has recently been interpreted to provide a remedy 
for private acts of employment discrimination.185 This section is 
narrower than title VII in that it only applies to race discrimination 
cases, but it is also broader in that it applies to employers who can-
not be reached under title VII.136 In addition, some of the pro-
cedural requirements of title VII, particularly the time-consuming 
and cumbersome investigation and conciliation procedures, may be 
avoided under section 1981.187 Finally, the relevant state statute 
of limitations is applied to section 1981 actions, allowing some ac-
tions that might otherwise be foreclosed by the statute of limitations 
contained in ·title VII.138 
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, now 42 U.S.C. § 1983, proscribes 
any deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state authority 
and has been interperted to provide a remedy for public sector em-
ployment discrimination based on race, sex, or national origin.180 
Since, unlike section 1981, section 1983 requires that state action 
be shown, it does not cover most discrimination in the private sector. 
As under section 1981, some of the procedural requirements of title 
133. 42 u.s.c. § 1981 (1970). 
134. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1970). 
135. See, e.g., Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th Cir. 
1971); Young v. IT&T, 438 F.2d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1971). See also Jones v. Alfred 
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
136. For instance, title VII excludes employers of fewer than fifteen employees, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. ill, 1973), the federal government, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 
(b) (1) (Supp. ill, 1973), private membership clubs, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(2) (Supp. 
III, 1973), and religious associations, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (Supp. III, 1973). 
131. See, e.g., Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th Cir. 
1971); Young v. IT&T, 438 F.2d 757, 761-64 (3d Cir. 1971); Larson, The Develop• 
ment of Section 1981 as a Remedy for Racial Discrimination in Private Employment, 
7 HARV. CIV. RlGHTS-C!v. LIB. L. REV. 56, 68-74 (1972). 
138. E.g., Young v. IT&T, 438 F.2d 757, 763 (3d Cir. 1971); Boudreaux v. Baton 
Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011, 1017 n.16 (5th Cir. 1971); Larson, 
supra note 137, at 76-83. 
139. See, e.g., Erie Human Relations Commn. v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 
1974); Vulcan Soc. of the N.Y.C. Fire Dept., Inc. v. Civil Serv. Commn., 490 
F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civ. Serv. 
Commn., 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d 
Cir. 1973) (en bane). 
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VIl can be avoided in a section 1983 suit, and the state statute of 
limitations is applied.140 
Neither section 1981 nor section 1983 contains any explicit legis-
lative mandate for ordering preferential remedies. Nevertheless, 
both statutes have been interpreted to permit, 141 and perhaps to re-
quire, 142 preferential remedies when there is an intentional143 or de 
facto144 history of employment discrimination. A very strict stand-
ard of review is applied, and a preferential remedy is allowed only 
when there are no alternative means of overcoming the effects of dis-
crimination and only for a period sufficient to break the pattern of 
discrimination. Although some concern has been expressed in the 
opinions for the problem of reverse discrimination, the courts seem 
to have accepted narrowly drawn preferential remedies145 as neces-
sary to end discrimination. 
The necessity for affirmative action to end discrimination has also 
been recognized under Executive Order 11246,146 which prohibits 
employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, 
and national origin by all contractors and subcontractors engaged in 
federal and federally assisted construction projects. It has been in-
terpreted to require preferential treatment as a condition to the 
award of government contracts when minorities or women are being 
140. See, e.g., Madison v. Wood, 410 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1969); Henig v. Odo-
rioso, 385 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1016 (1968). 
141. See, e.g., NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); Erie Human Re-
lations Commn. v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1974); Vulcan Soc. of the 
N.Y.C. Fire Dept., Inc. v. Civil Serv. Commn., 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973); Bridge-
port Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civ. Serv. Commn., 482 F.2d 1333, 1340-41 (2d 
Cir. 1973); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973) (en bane); 
Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 
(8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). But see Harper v. Mayor & 
City Council, 359 F. Supp. 1187 (D. Md.), atfd. sub nom. Harper v. Kloster, 486 
F.2d 1134, 1136-37 ( 4th Cir. 1973). 
142. See Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974). 
143. See, e.g., Erie Human Relations Commn. v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 
1974). 
144. See, e.g., Vulcan Soc. of the N.Y.C. Fire Dept., Inc. v. Civil Serv. Commn., 
490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973); Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970). 
145. For instance, in NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 621 (5th Cir. 1974), the 
court stated: 
[Quota relief] is a temporary remedy that seeks to spend itself as promptly as 
it can by creating a climate in which objective, neutral employment criteria can 
successfully operate to select public employees solely on the basis of job related 
merit . • . • It is a form of relief which should be reserved for those situations 
in which less restrictive means have failed or in which the chancellor could rea-
sonably foresee that they would fail. 
See Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 330-31 (8th Cir. 1972) (absolute preference 
modified to one-to-two ratio to reduce infringement on nonminority group appli-
cants). 
146. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. V, 1970). 
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"underutilized" by the contractor or when there are discriminatory 
barriers to equal opp,ortunity.147 Under this order, a number of local 
plans requiring good faith efforts to reach set goals for minority hir-
ing have been instituted, 148 but unlike the title VII preferences, the 
plans have been largely ineffective.140 This may be due in part to 
the establishment of unrealistically high goals, which contractors fre-
quently fail to reach.150 Also, the Office of Federal Contract Com-
pliance (OFCC) seems reluctant to implement the available sanc-
tions, such as cancelling contracts or debarring offenders from future 
federal contracts; it prefers instead to enter into compromises that 
tend to water down the plans.151 Nevertheless, the programs have 
received judicial approval in a number of cases152 and seem to have 
had some effect on minority hiring and public recognition of the 
problem. 
The Executive Order received implied legislative approval dur-
ing the consideration of the 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. In the debates over a proposed amendment designed 
to eliminate preferential treatment, Senator J avits read Contractors 
Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor158 into the 
record, and the rejection of the proposed amendment arguably im-
plies acceptance of the reasoning of that case. 
Programs under Executive Order 11246 are specifically designed 
to minimize the problem of reverse discrimination. Before affirma-
tive action plans are established, such factors as the availability of 
minorities and women for employment, whether those who are avail-
able have the requisite skills, and the existence of training programs, 
147. Guidelines to this effect have been issued by the Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance. See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-2.1 to .32 (1974). The guidelines apply to each 
nonconstruction prime or subcontractor who has 50 or more employees and a con-
tract of $50,000 or more. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.40,_ -2.1 (1974). See generally Nash, 
Affirmative Action Under Executive Order 11,246, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 225 (1971 ). 
148. See generally 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-5.1 to .30 (Washington Plan), -6.1 to .30 
(San Francisco Plan), -7.1 to .30 (St. Louis Plan), -8.1 to .30 (Atlanta Plan), -10.1 
to .30 (Camden Plan), -11.1 to .23 (Chicago Plan) (1974). 
149. See, e.g., Donegan, The Philadelphia Plan: A Viable Means of Achieving 
Equal Opportunity in the Construction Industry or More Pie in the Sky?, 20 KAN. 
L. RBv. 195 (1972); Jones, Federal Contract Compliance in Phase II-The Dawning 
of the Age of Enforcement of Equal Employment Obligations, 4 GA. L. REV. 756 
(1970). 
150. See, e.g., Donegan, supra note 149, at 210. 
151. Id. 
152. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 
9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974); Southern Ill. Builders Assn. v. 
Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972); Contractors Assn. of Eastern Pa. v. Secretary 
of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971). 
153. 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971). 
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are to be considered.154 When dealing with the construction indus-
try, the OFCC has encouraged labor, management, and the minority 
community in certain geographic localities to develop and agree 
upon an acceptable "hometown" affirmative action plan that, when 
approved by the OFCC, will prevent the imposition of a mandatory 
plan.11111 
Thus, preferential remedies have been recognized and enforced 
pursuant to title VII, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Civil Rights 
Act of 1871, and Executive Order 11246. Whether or not the Su-
preme Court ultimately rules that quota or preferential remedies 
under title VII are barred by section 703G), the issue may be moot 
from a practical standpoint. First, preferential remedies are avail-
able in race discrimination cases under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
now section 1981. Second, preferential remedies are also available 
in the public sector under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now section 
1983, in cases involving race, sex, and national origin employment 
discrimination.156 The most significant group of cases in which no 
preferential remedy could be granted if title VII is construed to for-
bid the use of such remedies, would be sex discrimination claims in 
the private sector. However, there is no logical reason to differen-
tiate between these cases.157 By using title VII cases as support 
for preferential remedies in cases based on Executive Order 11246 
and sections 1981 and 1983 (and vice versa), a number of judicial 
opinions have already suggested that the cases should be treated in 
a similar manner.158 It therefore appears that although the Supreme 
Court has yet to rule on the issue, the Senate debates and the over-
whelming majority of lower court decisions support the conclusion 
that preferential remedies, in one form or another, are permissible 
under all of the existing laws regulating employment practices in the 
United States. 
JV. THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES: 
A SEARCH FOR SOME UNIFYING PRINCIPLES 
As noted above, 159 it has been argued that preferential remedies 
154. See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-2.11 to .12 (1974); Nash, supra note 147, at 231. 
155. Nash, supra note 147, at 245-49. 
156. There is also some authority suggesting that the coverage of section 1981 
includes claims of race discrimination brought by white as well as black persons. 
See WRMA Broadcasting Co. v. Hawthorne, 365 F. Supp. 577 (M.D. Ala. 1973). 
157. See Watkins v. United Steelworkers Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221, 1230-31 
(E.D. La. 1974). 
158. See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 329 (8th Cir. 1971); Contractors 
Assn. of Eastern Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 172 (3d Cir. 1971). 
159. See text at and following note 101 supra. 
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may be permissible, but only when one race or sex is not deprived 
of a benefit by virtue of a preference given to another. Quotas are 
acceptable, the argument runs, to achieve school integration since 
everyone gets a seat in a classroom, but they are unacceptable in 
the employment context because the preferred ·hiring of a minority 
person usually disadvantages a nonminority person.160 This argu-
ment is particularly powerful in a period of economic recession when 
there are not enough jobs to go around.161 The use of remedial 
quotas and preferences under these conditions could increase racial 
tension so much that it would outweigh any benefit from the hiring 
of minority people.162 Because of this potentially detrimental effect, 
and because the courts apply rigid scrutiny in preference cases, 168 
the courts have imposed substantial limitations on preference orders. 
The purpose of ordering preferential treatment in the employ-
ment context is to overcome the effects of past discrimination, not 
to mandate specific proportions of each race and sex that must be 
employed.164 Once the effects of past discrimination are eliminated, 
the employer may be enjoined from renewing his discriminatory 
practices, but affirmative orders should cease and the employer 
should no longer be bound by quotas or percentage goals. Virtually 
every court that has ordered preferential treatment has recognized 
this, and the orders have been formulated to run either for a specific, 
limited period of time165 or until a specific, limited percentage or 
numerical goal is achieved.166 The goals must be set so that the 
employer can meet them without hiring unqualified persons, as a 
preferential remedy should never force an employer to hire some-
one who is not otherwise qualified or qualifiable but for his or her 
160. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 30, 507 P.2d 1169, 1181 (1973), 
vacated as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). 
161. See generally Watkins v. United Steelworkers Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221 
(E.D. La. 1974); Bender, Job Discrimination, 10 Years Later, N.Y. T1111es, Nov. 10, 
1974, § 3, at 1, col. 1; Note, supra note 44, at 1547-49; NEWSWEEK, Dec. 2, 1974, 
at 72. Cf. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. IBEW Local 327, 508 F.2d 687 (3d 
Cir. 1975); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Intl. Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 
(7th Cir. 1974 ). 
162. See, e.g., Detroit Free Press, May 10, 1975, § A, at 1, cots. 7-8; id., May 
11, 1975, § A. at 1, cot. 3; id., May 15, 1975, § A, at 1, cots. 7-8 (court order pro-
hibiting layoff of certain minority patrolmen led to bitter racial dispute on Detroit 
police force). 
163. See text at notes 91-114 supra. 
164. NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614,621 (5th Cir. 1974). 
165. See, e.g., United States v. Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 413 (2d Cir. 
1973). 
166. See, e.g., Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974) (per-
centage goal); Erie Human Relations Commn. v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 
1974) (numerical goal). 
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race or sex. Rather, it should force the employer to hire people who 
have not been hired because of their race or sex. 
In determining the proper limit or goal for a preferential remedy, 
the courts have considered a number of factors. First, some courts 
have considered the availability of qualified minority people in the 
geographic area constituting the job market.167 The appropriate 
geographic area is usually defined as the area from which the em• 
ployer or union has traditionally drawn its employees or members.168 
However, if the traditional job market suggested by the employer 
or union is unreasonably narrow and therefore excludes a potential 
pool of minority or women workers, the court may look at a wider 
region in determining the employment goal.169 The goal is typically 
based on the percentage of minority people in the appropriate job 
market who could have been employed by the company but for the 
prior discrimination.170 
Second, the courts consider the effect that a preferential remedy 
will have on the company or industry involved and on white male 
workers. To the extent that any dislocation can be minimized, the 
courts try to do so.171 
Finally, the availability of training programs for job applicants 
is considered in determining the preferential goal. The courts do 
not always require that potential applicants be qualified to do the 
work immediately, and it is often held sufficient that the pool of ap• 
plicants be capable of learning the job in a reasonable period of time 
if that is what was generally required by the company. In such 
cases, the courts have ordered preferences for training programs as 
well as for hiring.172 
The availability of training programs is particularly important in 
cases where employment tests have been invalidated and it has not 
been possible to develop a valid test. In Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co.,178 the Supreme Court held that an employment test may not 
167. See, e.g., Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87, 111, 122 (E.D. 
Mich. 1973), revd. on other grounds sub nom. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 
F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 
(5th Cir. 1974). 
168. Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 632 (2d Cit. 1974). 
169. Cf. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974). 
170. Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 632-33 (2d Cir. 1974). 
171. See, e.g., Erie Human Relations Commn. v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371, 375 (3d 
Cir. 1974). 
172. See Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 626 (2d Cir. 1974); 
United States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210, 216 (7th Cir. 1972); United 
States v. Ironworkers Local 86,443 F.2d 544, 552-54 (9th Cir. 1971). 
173. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The court recently elaborated upon the standards for 
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be used by an employer if it is shown to have an adverse impact 
on a protected class and it is not shown to be job related. This two-
fold standard may be difficult to meet; thus, some employers have 
found themselves forced to discard invalid tests and unable to de-
velop valid ones. · In such cases, the employer may not only be re-
quired to grant preferential treatment to minority persons to over-
come the effects of past discrimination, but may also be implicitly 
required to train them (and others) to perform the job.174 This 
does not mean that an employer will be forced to hire unqualified 
persons, as an invalid test cannot accurately predict job performance. 
For the same reason, a person cannot legitimately claim to be a vic-
tim of reverse discrimination merely because he or she was not hired 
after receiving a high score on an invalid employment test. This 
point is often lost in the furor over reverse discrimination. 
Preferential remedies only require that the preference be 
granted to qualified persons and generally assume that all persons 
within the pool of qualified applicants have equal ability. It would 
be difficult to rationalize the granting of preferences if a company 
were able to show that its applicants were not equal. Therefore, 
the question arises whether an employer may avoid the effect of a 
preferential remedy by "rank ordering" job applicants pursuant to 
an employment test or some other objective criterion. Several courts 
have indicated that an employer is entitled to hire the "best quali-
fied" person for a position.175 Also, the HEW Office for Civil Rights 
has recently .declared that a college or university may, under title 
IX, hire the "best qualified" person for a position and that the legal 
commitment of "affirmative action" merely requires the university 
to act in good faith in an effort to recruit minority persons and 
women.176 Although no case has been found in which rank ordering 
has been permitted, the "best qualified" cases make it at least the-
oretically possible that employers would be permitted to rank order 
applicants from best to least qualified. 
The problem with rank ordering is that it is difficult, if not impos-
sible, to develop a test that can rank order applicants with any degree 
test validation in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 43 U.S.L.W. 4880 (U.S. June 25, 
1915). 
174. Even when the employer can develop a valid employment test, the court 
may, as a further remedy against past discrimination, require the employer to offer 
pre-test tutoring to help minority persons prepare for the tests. See, e.g., Carter v. 
Galla~er, 452 F.2d 315, 319, 326 (8th Cir. 1971). 
115. See United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 448 (5th Cir. 
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); Wilson v. Woodward Iron Co., 362 F. 
Supp. 886, 894 (N.D. Ala. 1973). 
176. HEW, Memorandum to College and University Presidents, Dec., 1974. 
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of certainty, and an unvalidated test would presumably fail to satisfy 
the requirement of a "professionally developed ability test" under 
section 703(h) of title_VII.177 If rank ordering could pass muster 
under section 703(h), it would obviously tend to dilute the preferen-
tial remedy. This latter issue has generally been avoided by finding 
that the qualifying examination used was invalid and therefore could 
not legitimately rank applicants. 
Normally, before a preferential remedy is ordered there is a find-
ing of a history of discrimination against a protected group and a 
finding that other available relief would be inadequate to overcome 
the present effects of the discrimination.178 It is not necessary to 
show that an employer or- union intentionally discriminated against 
minorities or women; a history of de facto discrimination, the results 
of which are being perpetuated, is sufficient to establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination warranting a preferential remedy.179 A 
history of discrimination may be inferred from statistics that show 
a long-term disparity between the percentage of minority workers 
available in the job market and the percentage of minority workers 
employed.180 Generally, however, there is also nonstatistical evi-
dence of past and present discrimination: for example, the use of 
discriminatory criteria (such as nepotism in an all-White union), the 
use of subjective criteria -that are shown to statistically favor white 
males (such as supervisor recommendations where supervisors tend 
to recommend only Whites), the use of unvalidated employment 
tests, and specific instances of overt discrimination.181 In fact, al-
though statistical evidence alone has been found to be sufficient to 
177. 42 U.S.C. § 20-00e-2(h) (1970). Cf. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 
327-31 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discussing the problems involved in using 
the LSAT to "rank order" law school applicants). 
178. See, e.g., Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 631-32 (2d Cir. 
1974); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1974); Morrow v. Crisler, 
491 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1974); Harper v. Mayor & City Council, 359 F. Supp. 
1187, 1214 (D. Md.), affd. sub nom. Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 
1973); Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 306 F. Supp. 1355, 1359-60 
(D. Mass. 1969). 
179. Erie Human Relations Commn. v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371, 373-74 (3d Cir. 
1974). 
180. Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civ. Serv. Commn., 482 F.2d 1333, 
1335 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 550 (9th 
Cir. 1971). See generally Piss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Cm. 
L REv. 235, 270-73 (1971). 
181. See, e.g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civ. Serv. Commn., 482 
F.2d 1333, 1335-39 (2d Cir. 1973) (unvalidated test); United States v. N.L Indus., 
Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 369 (8th Cir. 1973) (subjective criteria; specific instances 
of discrimination); United States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210, 215, 220 
(7th Cir. 1972) (nepotism; subjective criteria; specific instances of discrimination). 
The list of indicators of discrimination is, of course, illustrative, not exhaustive. 
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support a finding of discrimination, 182 research has not disclosed any 
decisions ordering a preferential remedy upon only a statistical show-
ing of discrimination. This is reasonable since the courts are deal-
ing with strong medicine in preferential remedies and before pre-
scribing this treatment should be quite sure that the disease, discrim-
ination, is present.183 
A statistical showing of discrimination, even when there is addi-
tional nonstatistical evidence, only establishes a prima facie case of 
discrimination. The burdens of going forward and of persuasion 
then shift to the employer, who may justify the disparity on legiti-
mate "business necessity" grounds such as the unavailability of mi-
nority workers with necessary skills.184 Even if the employer cannot 
rebut the inference that he has engaged in discrimination, he may 
be able to avoid the imposition of a preferential remedy by showing 
that he has made good faith185 but unsuccessful efforts to recruit 
minority persons or women; this rebuttal is reasonable since an em-
ployer should not be required to adhere to an unrealistic ratio or 
goal. 
In addition to the above considerations, several other factors have 
apparently influenced the courts to grant or withhold preferential 
remedies in cases of employment discrimination. Curiously, the na-
ture of the work involved may influence a court's decision whether 
to mandate a preferential remedy. This tentative conclusion may 
be drawn from the fact that every decision granting a preferential 
remedy has involved blue-collar jobs. While very few cases have 
been brought concerning white-collar or professional jobs, the courts 
that have had an opportunity to issue preferential orders dealing with 
these jobs have avoided doing so. For example, in United States v. 
N. L. lndustries,186 preferential relief was ordered for the promotion 
of plant foremen but denied for the hiring of white-collar workers. 
The court gave no convincing reason for granting a more effective 
remedy for the promotion of a handful of foremen than for the ini-
tial hiring of a large number of white-collar workers. 
182. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421,426 (8th Cir. 1970). 
183. See generally Fiss, supra note 180, at 268-81. 
184. E.g., Vulcan Soc. of the N.Y.C. Fire Dept. v. Civil Serv. Commn., 490 
F.2d 387, 393 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210, 
214 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th 
Cir. 1971). Cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973 ); Griggs 
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). · 
185. Resistance to affirmative action measures other than preferences has been 
considered a good reason to order preferences. See, e.g., Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 
1053 (5th Cir. 1974). 
186. 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973). 
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Similarly, in Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co.,187 after finding a long 
history of discrimination on the part of Detroit Edison, the court 
ordered the use of specific hiring ratios for blue-collar jobs and man-
dated a general thirty per cent employment goal for Blacks in the 
company. Thus, while a relatively effective ratio remedy was 
granted for blue-collar workers, no substantial remedy was granted 
for white-collar discrimination: the company could meet its thirty 
per cent over-all goal without hiring Blacks for white-collar jobs. As 
in N. L. Industries, no reason was given for this difference in treat-
ment. 
Research has disclosed no decisions granting a preferential rem-
edy for white-collar employees. One explanation for this may be 
that the courts are simply wary -of breaking new ground with a con-
troversial remedy. Another explanation may be that judges perceive 
some unstated distinctions between white- and blue-collar jobs that 
make them reluctant to compel hiring on the basis of race or sex 
for the former jobs. It is sometimes claimed, for example, that it 
is more difficult to measure performance in white-collar jobs by ob-
jective standards because these jobs involve the exercise of judgment 
and a closer rapport with co-workers. The courts may assume that 
this is so and feel that they lack the competence to judge workers' 
abilities in these jobs; therefore they may be unwilling to intrude 
too far on an employer's discretion in hiring white-collar workers. 
Whatever the reasons for the apparent difference in judicial 
treatment of white- and blue-collar jobs, there does not appear to be 
any legitimate justification for this distinction. First, many white-
collar jobs involve work performance that can be measured by ob-
jective standards and many do not involve significant skill require-
ments. Second, criteri.a by which the courts determine whether to 
grant preferential remedies for blue-collar jobs can be used in all 
cases. The strict scrutiny applied by the courts in these cases would 
protect against unreasonable or unworkable preferential remedies. 
Finally, many white-collar jobs are generally regarded as preferred 
work, and these are precisely the jobs from which Blacks and women 
have traditionally been excluded. If the courts fail to use preferen-
tial remedies in these important cases, it will be a long time before 
the general goal of ending discrimination will be achieved. 
It is also interesting that virtually every case in which preferen-
tial remedies have been granted has involved race or national origin 
discrimination. Sex discrimination has rarely been considered as 
187. 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973), revd. on other grounds sub nom. EEOC 
v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975). 
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grounds for a preferential remedy. Since there appears to be no 
basis for distinguishing between the treatment of minorities and 
women under title VII or the Constitution, 1 RR it would be unfor-
tunate if this distinction developed.189 
Another factor that may be influencing judicial decisions to grant 
preferential remedies is the number of positions involved. The 
courts have tended to order preferential remedies primarily in cases 
involving relatively few jobs.10O This tendency suggests that the im-
pact of such remedies is far more limited than the controversy over 
them would seem to indicate. In a few cases, however, courts have 
granted preferential remedies when the number of positions was 
great.191 Thus, it is not clear how significant this factor is. 
Most of the title VII cases in which preferences have been 
granted have involved union membership or issuance of union work 
permits rather than hiring or promotion.192 It is easier for a court 
to grant a preferential remedy in a case where union membership 
is at issue because the problem of reverse discrimination rarely arises 
when a court compels the admission of minority workers into an all-
white union. Unless there is a direct relationship between union 
membership and job placement and the number of memberships is 
limited, the admission of Blacks or women into the union does not 
directly affect the job opportunities to white males. However, a 
number of courts have recognized that union membership may often 
be the equivalent of a job.193 This is especially true in the construc-
tion industry, where many of the title VII cases have arisen, since 
188. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (197S); Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
189. See, e.g., Rios v. Steamfitters Local 138, 501 F.2d 622, 632-33 (2d Cir. 
1974), in which the court granted a preferential remedy for minority workers but 
excluded statistics concerning women in determining the appropriate minority hiring 
goals. In doing so, the court reasoned that women had never shown an interest in 
becoming steamfitters. Because women's disinterest may well have reflected the 
knowledge that they would be excluded, the court's reasoning is specious. Bui see 
Schaefer v. Tannian, 394 F. Supp. 1136 (E.D. Mich. 197S). 
190. See, e.g., Erie Human Relations Commn. v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 
1971) (20 positions); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 31S (8th Cir. 1971) (20 posi• 
tions). This may, for example, have been a factor in United States v. N.L. Indus., 
Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973), where the court granted a preferential rem-
edy for 15 foreman positions but rejected a preferential remedy where one third of 
all white-collar positions was involved. 
191. See, e.g., NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1974) (one-Black-
to-one-White hiring ratio until 25 per cent of the approximately 930 Alabama Dept. 
of Public Safety employees were Black); United States v. Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 
408, 412 (2d Cir. 1973) (one-Black-to-one-White ratio in the issuance of 250 work 
permits annually for three years). 
192. See cases cited in note 121 supra. 
193. See text at note 126 supra. 
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contractors almost always favor union members. Thus, it is a short 
jump from preferences in union membership or union work permits 
to actual job preferences, and the courts should not have difficulty 
making this jump. The remedy should be available in either situa-
tion. 
Another factor influencing the decisions of some courts is the 
degree of cooperation or resistance by the employer or union in 
undertaking measures designed to remedy discrimination. The Su-
preme Court noted in the context of school desegregation that "[j]u-
dicial authority enters only when local authority defaults."194 Sim-
ilarly, in the employment context, the severity of the remedy may 
depend on how intractable the employer has been. If the employer 
is actively and in good faith attempting to recruit minority or women 
applicants to overcome the effects of past discrimination, there may 
be no need to order a controversial preferential remedy. Thus, the 
fact that the courts only order these severe remedies when employ-
ers make no adequate voluntary effort to eliminate the effects of past 
discrimination both limits the· number of court-ordered preferences 
and encourages voluntary action. Of course, where the employer 
is recalcitrant in recruiting or hiring minority or women applicants, 
a preferential order may be the only means of forcing an end to dis-
crimination.195 
One final factor that seems to enter into decisions on the appro-
priateness of preferential remedies is the stage at which the employ-
ment relationship is to be subjected to the remedy. Most of the 
cases in which preferences have been ordered involve the hiring of 
new employees. Although a preference in initial hiring does tend 
to favor one applicant at the expense of another, neither has a vested 
right to be hired and any expectation of favorable action on the part 
of the white male applicant is less legitimate than in situations such 
as promotion based on seniority. In the promotion cases based on 
seniority, the courts must balance the utility of preferential remedies 
in ending discrimination with the legitimate expectations of white 
employees. The courts' problem seems to be more acute in promo-
tion and layoff cases, where white males often have long-held expec-
tations, than in the hiring cases where the expectations are less clear. 
The courts are split on the advisability of ordering preferences 
in promotion cases and the decision in each case may depend on 
194. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). 
195. See note 185 supra and accompanying text Similarly, the Court in Swann 
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), ordered affirmative reme-
dies when the school board did not voluntarily integrate. 
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its particular facts. For example, in Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. 
Bridgeport-Civil Service Commission, 196 the court approved a prefer-
ence for initial hiring, but rejected a preference for promotions. It 
noted that an imbalance in higher ranks is often due to discrimina-
tion at the entry level, not to discrimination in promotion per se; 
thus, there was no history of discriminatory promotions to correct and 
correction of hiring discrimination would naturally correct imbal-
ances at higher levels over time.197 This argument overlooks the 
importance of ending the effects of discriminatory patterns within 
a reasonable period. Perhaps more persuasive is the court's argu-
ment that when promotion has traditionally had a time-in-grade re-
quirement or been granted in order of seniority, legitimate career 
expectations of nonminority workers are thwarted solely because of 
their color or sex if minority or female workers are preferred.198 
Many nonminority workers have invested years under the assump-
tion that they would receive promotions under the traditional pro-
cedure;. denial of this expectation may have the effect of exacerbat-
ing tensions between them and the preferred group. In such cases, 
it may be wise to reject outright preferences in favor of procedures 
designed to facilitate more indirectly access to higher level jobs, such 
as reducing the number of years that must be spent in lower level 
jobs.199 Where, on the other hand, there is no legitimate expecta-
tion of promotion (for instance, where the promotion decision has 
traditionally been made at the discretion of the company), it is easier 
to order a preferential remedy. 200 This seems closer to the hiring 
case, since, although there may occasionally be some inequity, non-
minority employees are not deprived of a benefit that they had rea-
son to expect. 201 
Analogous to the promotion-by-right problem is the fictional 
seniority problem that has been raised in layoff cases. Many minor-
ity and women workers, only recently hired under affirmative action 
programs, have been laid off during the present recession under "last 
196. 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973). 
197. 482 F.2d at 1339. 
198. 482 F.2d at 1341. But see note 199 infra. 
199. For example, the court in Bridgeport Guardians approved a reduction in the 
time-in-grade requirement and a reduction in the weight given to seniority. 482 F.2d 
at 1341. 
200. See, e.g., United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 367-69, 377 
(8th Cir. 1973). 
201. In addition, this promotion procedure may make it easier to prove that there 
was discrimination in promotion decisions if, for example, supervisors consistently 
chose Whites over Blacks for promotions. 
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hired, first fired" seniority systems. 202 Thus, the gains that were 
made over the past ten years are in danger of being lost through lay-
offs in the recession of the seventies. Since our economy will always 
be subject to cycles, if "last hired, first fired" is upheld, the achieve-
ment of equal opportunity may be slowed or halted. 203 
The courts are split on the question whether to grant fictional 
seniority to minority and women workers in order to insulate them 
from layoffs and protect the gains in job opportunities that have been 
made. 204 Those courts that have granted fictional seniority have 
reasoned that since minority and female workers would have been 
hired years earlier but for the discrimination, it is not improper to 
grant fictional seniority to put them in the position in which they 
would have been absent historical discrimination. 
However, since the effect of this remedy is to cause the displace-
ment of white male employees in favor of minority and female em-
ployees, it directly conflicts with the oft-cited dictum in Papermakers 
Local 189 v. United States.205 In that decision, the Fifth Circuit 
stated in effect that employees with real seniority should never be 
displaced by less senior employees pursuant to a court order altering 
an existing seniority system: "[C]reating fictional employment time 
for newly-hired Negroes would comprise preferential rather than re-
medial treatment. The clear thrust of the Senate debate [ concern-
ing sections 703(h) and (j)] is directed against such preferential 
202. See authorities cited in note 161 supra. 
203. The ultimate impact of cyclical recessions on affirmative action programs 
depends on a number of factors including the frequency and severity of the reces-
sions, the relative seniority of minority workers, and the number of.minority workers 
who either are not recalled, or forfeit their recall rights. See generally Note, supra 
note 44, at 1569 n.105. It is possible and indeed probable that some minority work-
ers will survive each recession without a layoff and that a number will be recalled 
and return to work when the economy swings upward. They would then accumulate 
seniority, which would make them more resistant to layoff in the next downturn. 
Thus, the most likely effect of cyclical recessions is to slow, rather than to halt, the 
achievement of equal employment goals. 
204. Compare Delay v. Carling Brewing Co., 10 BNA Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 164 
(N.D. Ga. 1974), and Loy v. City of Cleveland, 8 BNA Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 614, 
dismissed as moot, 8 BNA Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 617 (N.D. Ohio 1974), with Jersey 
Cent. Power & Light Co. v. !BEW Local 327, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975); Waters 
v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Intl. Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974); 
United Affirmative Action Commn. v. Gleason, 10 BNA Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 64 
(D. Ore. 1974), and Watkins v. Steelworkers Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 
1975). Cf. Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 994-95 (5th Cir. 
1969); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). See gen-
erally Blumrosen & Blumrosen, Layoff or Work Sharing: The Civil Rights Act of 
1964 in the Recession of 1975, 1 EMPLOYEE RBI.. L.J. 2 (1975); Friedman & Katz, 
Retroactive Seniority for the Identifiable Victim Under Title VII-Must Last Hired 
First Fired Give Way?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 28TH .ANNuAL CoNF.ERENCB ON 
LABOR, N.Y.U. (1975); Note, supra note 44. 
205. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969). 
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treatment on the basis of race."206 However, the court did uphold 
the district court's order creating a company-wide seniority system. 
This order had been issued to minimize the residual effects of a for-
merly segregated department structure. That structure was being 
perpetuated by a departmental seniority system under which only 
time worked in a department was credited toward seniority in the 
department. The court seemed persuaded that the company-wide 
seniority system was the most reasonable way to preserve the earned 
expectations of long-service employees while reducing the discrimin-
atory effects of fulfilling those expectations. 
The Papermakers dictum was followed in Waters v. Wisconsin 
Steel Works of International Harvester Co.207 In that case, the court 
refused to alter a "last hired, first fired" layoff system even though 
preserving the system meant that a disproportionate number of re-
cently hired Blacks who did not yet have contractual seniority would 
not be rehired.208 The court expressed concern that "[t]o hold 
otherwise would be tantamount to shackling white employees with 
a burden of a past discrimination created not by them but by their 
employer"209 and noted that title VII was not designed to affect 
"last hired, first fired" seniority provisions. 210 
Similarly, in Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. IBEW,211 the 
Third Circuit reversed a district court order that would have granted 
fictional seniority to women and minority employees to protect ear-
lier affirmative action gains during a period of layoffs. 212 The court 
206. 416 F.2d at 995. 
207. 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974). 
208. Under the employment contract, new employees accrued no seniority until 
the completion of a 90-day probationary period. 502 F.2d at 1313. The court did, 
however, hold that laid-off white employees who had accepted severance pay and thus 
terminated their contractual rights could not be rehired before Blacks with con-
tractual seniority were recalled since this would amount to "presently perpetuating 
the racial discrimination of the past." 502 F.2d at 1321. 
209. 502 F.2d at 1320. 
210. 502 F.2d at 13-17-20. The legislative history of title VII provides some 
support for the court's stance: "Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill. 
If under a 'last hired, first fired' agreement a Negro happens to be the 'last hired,' 
he can still be 'first fired' as long as it is done because of his status as 'last hired' 
and not because of his race." 502 F.2d at 1318, quoting 110 CoNo. REc. 7217 
(1964) (questions and answers prepared by Senator Clark). See also 110 CO!'IG, 
REC. 6563-64 (remarks of Senator Kuchel), 7207 (Dept. of Justice memorandum), 
7213 (Clark-Case memorandum) (1964). 
211. 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975). 
212. The company had entered into a collective bargaining agreement under 
which it agreed that any layoffs would be by reverse seniority. However, the com-
pany had also entered into a conciliation agreement with the EEOC that established 
a five-year affirmative action plan designed to increase the percentage of women and 
minority employees. The district court found that if the company followed "last 
hired, first fired," the percentage of minority employees would decrease and this 
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noted that section 703(h) of title VIl213 on its face en101ns the 
courts from interfering with a "bona fide" seniority sytem;214 it 
"conclude[d] in light of the legislative history that on balance a fa-
cially neutral company-wide seniority system, without more, is· a bona 
fide seniority system and will be sustained even though it may oper-
ate to the disadvantage of females and minority groups as a result 
of past employment practices."215 
Nevertheless, a few federal district courts have struck down lay-
off provisions that would affect a disproportionate number of minor-
ity workers. For instance, in Watkins v. United Steelworkers Local 
2369,216 the court found that the legislative history surrounding sec-
tion 703(h) did not clearly preclude the granting of a preferential 
remedy in a layoff situation. The court observed that the interpreta-
tive comments regarding seniority were made during the Senate de-
bates prior to the time when section 703(h) was inserted into title 
Vll. It therefore concluded that these remarks could not be con-
sidered determinative in construing the statute.· Rather, the court 
ruled that section 703(h) literally protected only bona fide seniority 
systems and that a system perpetuating the effects of past discrimina-
tion cannot be bona fide. 217 The court rejected the Papermakers 
dictum as mere "remarks . . . made without the benefit of adversary 
arguments"218 and noted that since the Fifth Circuit in Papermakers 
had altered an existing seniority system in order to desegregate vari-
ous jobs within a company, there was no reason why a company that 
had refused to hire Blacks at all should be allowed to perpetuate 
would violate the conciliation agreement The Third Circuit reversed, holding that 
the company's duty under the conciliation agreement was to use affirmative action 
in hiring, but that there was no such duty in laying off employees. 508 F.2d at 703. 
213. Section 703(h) provides, in part: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compen-
sation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to 
a bona fide seniority or merit system • • . provided that such differences are not 
the result of an intention to discriminate because of -race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). 
214. 508 F.2d at 705. 
215. 508 F.2d at 710 (emphasis original). The court also noted that the col-
lective bargaining agreement did not violate public policy as enunciated by title VII, 
since section 703 (h) does not permit interference with a bona fide seniority system. 
508 F.2d at 705. 
216. 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974). See also Schaefer v. Tannian, 394 F. 
Supp. 1136 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Delay v. Carling Brewing Co., 10 BNA Fair Emp. 
Prac. Cas. 164 (N.D. Ga. 1974). 
217. 369 F. Supp. at 1227-29. 
218. 369 F. Supp. at 1229. 
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the effects of that discrimination through its seniority rules.219 Thus, 
the court in effect found that any detriment to nonminority employ-
ees was, on balance, outweighed by the need to overcome the effects 
of past discrimination. 
This decision, however, was reversed by the Fifth Circuit. 220 
That court held that neither title VII nor section 1981 barred the 
use of a long-established seniority system, adopted without intent to 
discriminate, even though minority-employee balance would be ad-
versely affected. But the court noted as part of its deliberately nar-
row holding that the employer's hiring practices had been nondis-
criminatory for over ten years and that none of the individual em-
ployees laid off had personally been the victim of prior employment 
discrimination. 221 The court 
specifically [did] not decide the rights of a laid-off employee who 
could show that, but for the discriminatory refusal to hire him at an 
earlier time than the date of his actual employment, or but for his 
failure to obtain earlier employment because of exclusion of minority 
employees from the work force, he would have sufficient seniority to 
insulate him against layoff. 222 
The Fifth Circuit decision in Wat kins suggests the two parts into 
which the fictional seniority-layoff problem can be divided. First, 
there is the problem of the appropriate remedy for individuals who 
have suffered specific instances of discrimination. For example, a 
minority person who applied for a job two years ago and was rejected 
because of race would most likely be ordered hired and given back 
pay for the two-year period. But if a company using a "last hired, 
first fired" seniority system decides to lay off some workers, the same 
minority employee will have no seniority and will be the first to go. 
In such a case, where the specific discriminatees can be identified, 
retroactive seniority should be granted. 223 The white male workers 
who might be disadvantaged are not really being treated unfairly be-
cause they will be in exactly the same position as that in which they 
219. 369 F. Supp. at 1229. 
220. Watkins v. United Steelworkers Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975), 
221. Indeed, the black employees involved had been with the company for from 
two to seven years at the time the Whites who would be denied recall by the rein-
statement of the Blacks had been hired. 516 F.2d at 46. 
222. 516 F.2d at 45. 
223. In fact, this remedy has been approved by at least two circuit courts. See 
Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975); Jurinko v. Edwin L. 
Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir. 1973). But see Franks v. Bowman Transp. 
Co., 495 F.2d 398, 417-18 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 983 (1975). 
The court of appeals in Franks held that a court cannot grant fictional seniority to 
black job applicants who were refused employment because of racial discrimination 
even though the discrimination occurred subsequent to the passage of title VII. 
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would have been but for the discrimination. While it may be true 
that white males should not be prejudiced by the company's past dis-
crimination, there is no reason why they should retain an unearned 
advantage.224 Besides, the retroactive seniority remedy, when lim-
ited to identifiable discriminatees, would have no effect on most em-
ployees, since the basic seniority system would be left intact. 
The more difficult problem arises when a company with a long 
history of discrimination finally starts hiring Blacks and women, 
though none hired are specific discriminatees. If the employer then 
finds it necessary to cut back its work force, and fictional seniority 
is granted to the recently hired Blacks and women, Whites who had 
an expectation of continued employment or promotion based on their 
seniority will find their expectations thwarted because of their race 
or sex. However, if the remedy is denied, a round of layoffs can 
restore the earlier raciai or sexual employee imbalance. 
The legislative history of section 703(h) suggests tliat whether 
or not Congress actually meant to prohibit fictional seniority as a 
remedy under title VTI, it did not intend affirmatively to endorse 
that remedy.225 In the absence of any clear legislative mandate, the 
courts should at least scrutinize the layoff-fictional seniority cases 
very carefully and attempt to find some other means of handling the 
problem. One possibility might be to reduce the hours of all the 
company's employees where possible to distribute the burden of past 
224. Some support for this position may be found in the Supreme Court's recent 
decision in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 43 U.S.L.W. 4880 (U.S. June 25, 1975), 
where the Court discussed the standards by which back pay should be awarded after 
proof of a violation of title VII. First, the Court made it clear that title VII "requires 
that persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the unlawful practice be, 
so far as possible, restored to a position where they would have been were it not 
for the unlawful discrimination." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4885, quoting 118 CONG. R.Ec. 
7168 (1972). Second, the Court observed that the remedial provisions of title VII 
were fashioned after the remedial provisions of the National Labor Relations Act and 
should therefore be construed in a manner consistent with case precedent under the 
NLRA. See 43 U.S.L.W. at 4884, 4885 n.16. Reinstatement with back pay and with 
retroactive seniority rights is a common remedy for victims of unfair labor practices 
under the NLRA. See, e.g., NLRB v. Lone Star Textiles, Inc., 386 F.2d 535, 537 
(5th Cir. 1967); Ventre Packing Co., Inc., 163 N.L.R.B. 540, 543 (1967); Darling-
ton Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 255 n.44 (1962); West Boylston Mfg. Co., 87 
N.L.R.B. 808, 813 (1949). Although many of the NLRA cases have involved dis-
criminatory discharg~, the NLRB has also awarded retroactive seniority to victims 
of unlawful discrimination in refusal to hire cases. See, e.g., Aclang, Inc., 193 
N.L.R.B. 86 (1971); Bob's Casing Crews, 178 N.L.R.B. 3 (1969). Thus, in follow-
ing the suggestions made by the Supreme Court in Albermarle that victims of unlaw-
ful discrimination should be "restored to a position where they would have been were 
it not for the unlawful discrimination" and that the case law under the NLRA should 
be followed in developing remedies under title VII, it will not be surprising to see 
the Court hold that persons who have been unlawfully denied job-rights at the hiring 
stage may be awarded both back pay and retroactive seniority under title VII. 
225. See note 210 supra and accompanying text. 
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discrimination. Alternatively, the employer might rotate those em-
ployees on layoff, so that each employee could work some weeks 
and be on layoff other weeks. 226 
Part of the problem when there are no specific discriminatees 
is that there is no way to determine whether the workers who bene-
fit from fictional seniority are the same workers who were hurt by 
the company's prior discrimination, and, conversely, there is no way 
to tell how much the nonminority workers benefited from the dis-
crimination. In many cases there will be no correlation for either 
minority or nonminority workers between their individual positions 
and the discrimination. Although this problem also exists in the 
preferential hiring cases, it is less serious in those cases because they 
do not involve impingements upon long-standing expectations of 
nonminority workers and therefore are not likely to create as much 
tension. Thus, fictional seniority cases should be even more strictly 
scrutinized than hiring preferences, with an eye toward working out 
some compromise that will thwart neither the white male's job ex-
pectations nor the movement toward equal employment opportunity. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Preferential remedies are now an acceptable means of eradicat-
ing the effects of past discrimination. However, because such reme-
dies raise a number of legal and moral questions concerning reverse 
discrimination against white male workers, their use is strictly lim-
ited. They are only employed to eliminate the effects of past dis-
226. These possible alternatives were proposed in New York City Commn. on 
Human Rights, Interpretive Memorandum Concerning Procedures Required by Fed-
eral, State, and Local Anti-Discrimination Laws When an Employer Is Planning Re-
duction in Labor Costs That Could Result in Layoffs, n.d., discussed in Laying Of I 
Employees Pursuant to a Seniority System, 9 BNA Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. supp., at 
1, 11 (Feb. 22, 1975). 
The EEOC bas recently issued guidelines on seniority-based layoffs that indicate 
that there is reasonable cause to believe that an employer violates title VII "by con-
ducting layoffs pursuant to a seniority system which operates to exclude a dispropor-
tionate number of Black employees because of past discrimination." EEOC Decision 
No. 75-251, 10 BNA Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 1405 (May 8, 1975). Thus, it may be 
that a union bas a duty to propose alternatives to "last hired, first fired" layoff and 
recall procedures when such a system will have the effect of perpetuating past dis• 
crimination. A number of courts have recognized that the union's duty of fair repre-
sentation includes a duty at least to attempt to negotiate seniority systems that do 
not lock minority employees into the lowest positions in the company. See, e.g., 
EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1915); Johnson v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1381-82 (5th Cir. 1974). If a union can be held 
liable for acquiescing in a departmental seniority system that locks minority employ-
ees into low-level jobs, it seems entirely logical also to bold the union liable for ac-
quiescing in a seniority system that actually denies employment to minority em-
ployees who have little seniority because of past discrimination. 
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crimination and only when no alternative means exist for accomplish-
ing that goal. They are always temporary remedies, set to expire 
as soon as the past discrimination is corrected. Finally, they are only 
granted to qualified applicants who could be employed even if pref-
erences were not ordered. As a result, preferential remedies have 
been ordered only in a relatively small number of cases. 
The limitations emphasize the main problem faced by the courts 
in preferential remedy cases-that of balancing the interests of 
minority workers in equal employment opportunity with the interests 
of nonminority workerS' in employment. This balancing is necessary 
both because preferential remedies are equitable in nature and 
should therefore be as fair as possible to all concerned and because 
the courts in employment cases serve the goal of equal employment 
while equalizing the position of minority workers if people of differ-
ent races and sexes are to work side by side. · 
All things considered, preferential remedies as presently used by 
the courts in employment cases serve the goal of equal employment 
opportunity and support the ultimate achievement of the principle 
of "color blindness;" these remedies are therefore a valuable weapon 
in the fight against discrimination. 
[Professor Edwards' views on "last hired, first fired" and "fic-
tional seniority'' are more fully set forth in a paper entitled The Cost 
of Equality: Civil Rights During Periods of Economic Stress, de-
livered as part of the David C. Baum Memorial Lecture Series at 
the University of Illinois Law School on October 30, 1975. This 
paper will be published by the University of Illinois-Ed.] 

